YZJ Fin Hldg    Last:0.23    -0.01

YZJFH - potentially rewarding

Have faith with yzj organisations.

YZJSB listed in 2007. It suffered setback in 2008 but survived with growth after15 years, it finally splits into two financially independent companies this year.

YZJFH now suffered setback for reasons unknown.
In time to come, YZJFH share price should bounce back to above NVA value.

Based on last 6 months observations, the performance of this company has nothing to do with China, USA and STI mkt. To certain extent SBB is short selling. When share buy back stopped over last few days, short selling correspondingly stops.( Except retail keeps short sell, but it won't affect erosion of share price).

Looking forward, we may need to wait for company announcement as for the time being this new management team stays very quiet to the extent that it is unbearable by most retail investors.

Hold or discard. If hold then keep up your faith.

 

We must remember that Yangzijiang Financial is Banking Business, only without depositors to service. They dont need to depend on share price for their capital. However share price do affect the balance sheet since they do Share Buy Back and hold treasury shares.

emailpeter      ( Date: 04-Nov-2022 09:41) Posted: Thanks @volvo for the explanation, albeit being no more than theatrically circumstantial evidence. If one is to think of FH as an unlisted company (private equity), then we need not follow it's share price. Just look to its forthcoming dividends to judge our intelligence (or even the lack off) in investing to FH. I guess only the nuts & bolts in Feb 2023 results will give good insight to future, as they need to proof successful exit of CN DI, and setting up solid income streams overseas. We all await that eagerly. Until then, you'd agree that all their past and present 'charlies angel team' announcements are proving superfluous, almost to a mockery to the share price and laughed at by the casino investors. volvo125      ( Date: 03-Nov-2022 22:59) Posted: Your question on the quality of assets is certainly valid but I doubt any outsider can give any answer. I accord a high degree of trust on the financial statements and introductory documents due to the following consideraions :- 1.    YFH is a spin off from YZJ, a high quality component stock of STI with a successful operating track record since 2007. DI has been operating within YZJ since 2010 and contributing positively in the past 12 years. The financial statements were audited by PWC and then gained approval from SGX after regulatory scrutiny. If we doubt YFH financial statement, then we are also doubting the authenticity of YZJ financial statement, the credential of PWC and also SGX. 2.    Besides Ren and Toe, the other Board members includung the Advisor are all ex senior Directors from MAS, SGX and GIC. These people are veterans from the regulatory and investment financial sectors with deep connections and reputations. I do not think these people at their high social and professional level will want to associate themselves with YFH if they have doubts on the coy financial statement. Of course, one can still choose not to believe the financial statement for whatever the reason even if it is just a gut feel. In such a case, the advise is to refrain from investing in the coy. If I could not bring myself to take the financial statement in good faith in spite of the coy historical track records, the coy parentage, the auditing credential of PWC and the regulatory approval credential of SGX, then every thing I see are garbage with no basis for analysis. I saw many very shallow comments ... such as the management shorting its own stocks to sbb at a lower price, the DI 18% from real estate will go bad with big write  ..... People made these comments without understanding on the listing rule as well as the movement of DI such as the additions, redeemptions and the maturity period. I just laughed them off ... Note : YFH Introductory document dated 1Apr22 : Page 52~55 : info relating DI risk, Page 125 : info relating to DI and its nature of operations such as collatora

 

Thanks @volvo for the explanation, albeit being no more than theatrically circumstantial evidence.

If one is to think of FH as an unlisted company (private equity), then we need not follow it's share price. Just look to its forthcoming dividends to judge our intelligence (or even the lack off) in investing to FH.

I guess only the nuts & bolts in Feb 2023 results will give good insight to future, as they need to proof successful exit of CN DI, and setting up solid income streams overseas. We all await that eagerly.
Until then, you'd agree that all their past and present 'charlies angel team' announcements are proving superfluous, almost to a mockery to the share price and laughed at by the casino investors.

volvo125      ( Date: 03-Nov-2022 22:59) Posted: Your question on the quality of assets is certainly valid but I doubt any outsider can give any answer. I accord a high degree of trust on the financial statements and introductory documents due to the following consideraions :- 1.    YFH is a spin off from YZJ, a high quality component stock of STI with a successful operating track record since 2007. DI has been operating within YZJ since 2010 and contributing positively in the past 12 years. The financial statements were audited by PWC and then gained approval from SGX after regulatory scrutiny. If we doubt YFH financial statement, then we are also doubting the authenticity of YZJ financial statement, the credential of PWC and also SGX. 2.    Besides Ren and Toe, the other Board members includung the Advisor are all ex senior Directors from MAS, SGX and GIC. These people are veterans from the regulatory and investment financial sectors with deep connections and reputations. I do not think these people at their high social and professional level will want to associate themselves with YFH if they have doubts on the coy financial statement. Of course, one can still choose not to believe the financial statement for whatever the reason even if it is just a gut feel. In such a case, the advise is to refrain from investing in the coy. If I could not bring myself to take the financial statement in good faith in spite of the coy historical track records, the coy parentage, the auditing credential of PWC and the regulatory approval credential of SGX, then every thing I see are garbage with no basis for analysis. I saw many very shallow comments ... such as the management shorting its own stocks to sbb at a lower price, the DI 18% from real estate will go bad with big write  ..... People made these comments without understanding on the listing rule as well as the movement of DI such as the additions, redeemptions and the maturity period. I just laughed them off ... Note : YFH Introductory document dated 1Apr22 : Page 52~55 : info relating DI risk, Page 125 : info relating to DI and its nature of operations such as collatoral emailpeter      ( Date: 03-Nov-2022 14:19) Posted: Dear @Volvo125, again a cordial thank you for your fresh insights. This thread is more fundamental in nature, I beg your paron to post here. Although I am CPA trained, I will abstain from overanalysing your deep fundamental study of NTA & projected EPS of FH. For the simple fact of the big disparity (lets upgrade it to obscene) between its share (aka the public reading of its NTA) compared to your calculations. You' d agree the disparity is leaving only crumbs from its so called NTA. As fellow investors, we have every reason to be concerned, without any clarity, we can only go by public related information disclosed of the conditions around them, note : around them. I am  concerned of their asset quality, hence we might well be basing calcs on figures that have hugely depleted.  Again I repost below my confusion, over asset quality, and hope clued up ones like you and others can enlighten..... ------------- 30 June 2022      57% of the total portfolio So these contain the micro loans to businesses, are these like banks where they hold a floating or fixed charge over its assets ? Or merely hold their title, in what form ? A fixed charge or merely caveat and transfer form signed ? Do they end up taking over the keys of the business ? What kind of businesses are all these, retail or wholesale, manufacturers or whatever ? Sounds like they will need some receivers or liquidators.    Their corporate loans are not a pile of FD' s that they can walk in to bank and claim, its a lot more convulated. If they are exiting this business and these borrowers are unable under these recession conditions to refinance, they might as well take FH to cleaners, default and " deem sold" land to FH, surely a big profit over their historical cost, which reflects as a huge NPL for FH. Jiangsu province.  land title is held as collateral by the Group Managing their cashflow and holding the land title (exactly what the bondholders and banks did with Evergrande). Seems like their funds went in as a Joint Venture. When sales collapse, or the buyers default, they are in the same boat as its developer. FH seems to be like a property developer in this case.  Again we only have faint info of this.    their land titles held on Jiangsu projects, they can' t just foreclose master title and auction while SPA' s are signed and sitting on it. And buyers houses built on them... Cash and yield enhancement products and equity investments form approximately 29% and 14% of the total portfolio respectively. Glad to hear the 29% remains intact. The dream team in SG can utilise this to work out their grandious plans. The 14% equity-surely depleted like the share price of FH, or main market. We don' t even know what shares they hold. At least name us the Top 5 equity it contains. Vested with 600k shares now. Surely management owes its shareholders thees answers. OR BB' s like TR have privy and found it' s can of worms........

 

Thank you sir for the detailed and useful sharing. Very insightful and thought through. The sentiment towards Chinese credit markets is plagued by the contagion seen with the real estate sector, and this has an unhelpful association across the board. Institutional investors in particular sell when there' s uncertainty and doubt.

Just a point to add and raise - if they were to move money out from China, would that be subject to withholding tax? If so, would that be at a 10% impact to the NAV? Not sure if any experts here may have an opinion or view on that please?

volvo125      ( Date: 02-Nov-2022 22:26) Posted: This is my objective thought on YFH. Ignore if you think it is trash especially when probably everyone (including myself, of course) here is flushed with frustration and anger because the price indeed has been mysteriously thrashed down by some unknown forces for some unknown reasons & hellip .   YFH had in 1H22 result release achieved a NPAT $136m and then went on to guide its FY22 NPAT at $220m. NAV per share stood at 1.07 as at 30Jun22.   The persistent and violent sell down to all time low 0.31 seems to suggest that the coy is broken with either being (1)  tainted with fraudulent investigations or (2)  met with a going concern such as an imminent default risk or (3)  expecting to incur huge FY22 net losses   It cannot be (1) because YFH was just spun off 5 months ago with a clean audited balance sheet and cash flow under the scrutiny of SGX approval. It also cannot be (2) because YFH is net cash with negligible s/t debt so the default risk is zero. So big Sellers and Shorts are likely betting YFH will miss its FY22 NPAT big time or worst still, incur a net FY22 loss due to the significant RMB devaluation against SGD/USD, higher NPL, weak China stock market & hellip . etc.   I have done a deeper analysis on YFH based on its 1H22 releases and projected its FY22 P& L and NAV per share. I believe YFH will hit its FY22 NPAT at $218~224m with NAV per share increase to 1.13 (at 90%SBB). Even if we were to factor in a further 10% impact on the 2H22 NPAT due to further US rate hikes of 0.75% in Nov and 0.5% in Dec, YFH FY22 NPAT will still hit ~$210m which is near to its target. The steep sell down to all time low 0.31 is fear mongering to the extreme.   I have yet to pick up anything fundamentally wrong with YFH except the market sentiment in general (Capital flights due to rising US interest rates) and the current China challenging economic and still ongoing covid zero conditions. So, to all the Longs, Steady.   The details are given below if you are interested to find out how the numbers are computed. Please note that the numbers are estimates at best based on opening and closing balances averages instead of actual monthly movement balances which are not available to the public. Also, the impact of RMB devaluation may also be mitigated by some forms of financial instrument hedges which professional fund and money managers such as YFH will know how to do. For the smaller segment non interest incomes, I will use the 1H22 as assumptions.   I am not a CPA or certified Public Accountant so if there is a brother here who is an accountant to validate my numbers or assumptions or blind spots or accounting treatments would be greatly appreciated. I certainly look forward to seeing YFH FY22 release in Feb23 to see how my crude projection compares.   1H22 is YFH latest release so it will form the baseline for our further analysis.   1H22 :-   NPAT $136m was achieved in 1H22 in spite of currency and financial market weakness :- -  RMB v SGD down 2.3% ( 4.71 to 4.82, 31Dec21~30Jun22), Adversely affected as SGD is the reporting currency. -  SGD v USD down 3% (1.35 to 1.39, 31Dec21~30Jun22) -  RMB v USD down 5.3% (6.36 to 6.7, 31Dec21~30Jun22), this will adversely affect the first tranche of 11% (~$480m) fund transfer to Sg in 1H22. -  100% China RMB portfolio on 1Jan22 to 89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 31Jun22. This 11% Sg USD portfolio can only be initiated after spin off in May so YFH was still on a major basis being exposed to RMB 2.3% devaluation against SGD for reporting purpose in 1H22, and on a minor basis to RMB 5.3% devaluation against USD on the 11% Sg portfolio or the reported SGD480m in USD denomination. The currency translation loss was likely 90%*4.44B*2% = ~$79m. -  fair value adjustment ($19m losses) to the PRC $633m listed equity investments portfolio in Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange due to weak financial market sentiment (non interest income). -  DI 70% ($3.5b) on 1Jan21 to DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22, this explained the lower interest income affecting the P& L in 1H22.   Now, let us attempt to construct the 2H22 P& L based on the known or extrapolated information below :-   2H22 :-   -  RMB v SGD down 6.6% (4.82 to 5.14, 30Jun22~1Nov22). RMB devaluation against SGD had further worsen by 3x the impact felt in 1H for reporting in SGD currency. -  SGD v USD down 2.2% (1.39 to 1.42, 30Jun22~1Nov22) -  RMB v USD down 8.2% (6.7 to 7.25, 30Jun22~1Nov22), this will adversely affect the transfer of second tranche 11% fund to Sg in 2H22. -  89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 30Jun22 to 78% China RMB v 22% Sg USD portfolio by 31Dec22. -   DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22 to DI 50% (est. $2.22b) by 31Dec22. Interest income will go lower than 1H22 and currency translation loss will increase to ~$150m (~6.5% RMB devaluation against SGD) and affecting the Bal Sht NAV. $1.75B DI will matured and ~$1.42B will be added to maintain DI at 50%. -  there will be further fair value adjustment losses (?) to the PRC listed equity portfolio due to the continuous weakness in the PRC stock markets. We will best assume a further -$19m fair value losses as in 1H22. -  We will also best assume the dividend income to remain steady at $7.6m -  The steady state historical returns (interest income) for DI is ~12% pa or ~3% per quarter or ~6% per half year. The average DI return in 1H21 was 190m/[(3438m+3461m)/2] = 5.5%, and the average DI return in 1H22 was 184m/[(3514m+2659m)/2] = 5.96%. We will assume the 2H22 DI return at (5.5+5.96)/2 = 5.75%. -  The average interest income in 2H22 = [(2.53B+2.2B)/2]*5.75% = $136m -  We will also assume the SG& A expenses similar to 1H22 on the high side at $15m. -  We assume no reversal or addition of allowance for credit or other losses and NPL stays at ~2% which is well covered by the 4.7% provisions ($123m) provided for the full amount of DI exposure. -  1H21 tax was 24%, 1H22 tax was 19.5%. We will assume an average tax rate of 20% with 22% of portfolio in SG. -  NPAT = [Interest income - non interest income losses & ndash expenses]*80% = [136-11-15]*80% = $88m -  FY22 NPAT = 136m+88m = $224m or 136m+(82m*93%) = $218m if we tag a ~7% currency translation loss from RMB/SGD in 2H22.   -  With 78% of portfolio in China (RMB) by 31Dec22, the currency translation loss = 0.78*4.44B*7% = $242m will affect reporting in SGD and will in turn adversely affected the NAV. SBB will counter this negative impact. -    Assume SBB at 90% done by 31Dec22 or 0.9*395*0.38 average buyback price = 355m shares or $135m. As at 31Oct22, YFH spent $98.94m to buy back 259.56m shares at 0.381 average price. -    NAV/share = (1H22NAV-355m SBB-currency translation loss+FY22 NPAT)/Outstanding shares = (4.226B-135-242+218)/(3950-355) = 1.13 before dividend being declared. -    NAV will fall from 4.226B to 4.067B but NAV per share will increase from 1.07 to 1.13.   Rate This Post:

 

Your question on the quality of assets is certainly valid but I doubt any outsider can give any answer. I accord a high degree of trust on the financial statements and introductory documents due to the following consideraions :-

1.    YFH is a spin off from YZJ, a high quality component stock of STI with a successful operating track record since 2007. DI has been operating within YZJ since 2010 and contributing positively in the past 12 years. The financial statements were audited by PWC and then gained approval from SGX after regulatory scrutiny. If we doubt YFH financial statement, then we are also doubting the authenticity of YZJ financial statement, the credential of PWC and also SGX.
2.    Besides Ren and Toe, the other Board members includung the Advisor are all ex senior Directors from MAS, SGX and GIC. These people are veterans from the regulatory and investment financial sectors with deep connections and reputations. I do not think these people at their high social and professional level will want to associate themselves with YFH if they have doubts on the coy financial statement.

Of course, one can still choose not to believe the financial statement for whatever the reason even if it is just a gut feel. In such a case, the advise is to refrain from investing in the coy. If I could not bring myself to take the financial statement in good faith in spite of the coy historical track records, the coy parentage, the auditing credential of PWC and the regulatory approval credential of SGX, then every thing I see are garbage with no basis for analysis.

I saw many very shallow comments ... such as the management shorting its own stocks to sbb at a lower price, the DI 18% from real estate will go bad with big write  ..... People made these comments without understanding on the listing rule as well as the movement of DI such as the additions, redeemptions and the maturity period. I just laughed them off ...

Note : YFH Introductory document dated 1Apr22 : Page 52~55 : info relating DI risk, Page 125 : info relating to DI and its nature of operations such as collatoral

emailpeter      ( Date: 03-Nov-2022 14:19) Posted: Dear @Volvo125, again a cordial thank you for your fresh insights. This thread is more fundamental in nature, I beg your paron to post here. Although I am CPA trained, I will abstain from overanalysing your deep fundamental study of NTA & projected EPS of FH. For the simple fact of the big disparity (lets upgrade it to obscene) between its share (aka the public reading of its NTA) compared to your calculations. You' d agree the disparity is leaving only crumbs from its so called NTA. As fellow investors, we have every reason to be concerned, without any clarity, we can only go by public related information disclosed of the conditions around them, note : around them. I am  concerned of their asset quality, hence we might well be basing calcs on figures that have hugely depleted.  Again I repost below my confusion, over asset quality, and hope clued up ones like you and others can enlighten..... ------------- 30 June 2022      57% of the total portfolio So these contain the micro loans to businesses, are these like banks where they hold a floating or fixed charge over its assets ? Or merely hold their title, in what form ? A fixed charge or merely caveat and transfer form signed ? Do they end up taking over the keys of the business ? What kind of businesses are all these, retail or wholesale, manufacturers or whatever ? Sounds like they will need some receivers or liquidators.    Their corporate loans are not a pile of FD' s that they can walk in to bank and claim, its a lot more convulated. If they are exiting this business and these borrowers are unable under these recession conditions to refinance, they might as well take FH to cleaners, default and " deem sold" land to FH, surely a big profit over their historical cost, which reflects as a huge NPL for FH. Jiangsu province.  land title is held as collateral by the Group Managing their cashflow and holding the land title (exactly what the bondholders and banks did with Evergrande). Seems like their funds went in as a Joint Venture. When sales collapse, or the buyers default, they are in the same boat as its developer. FH seems to be like a property developer in this case.  Again we only have faint info of this.    their land titles held on Jiangsu projects, they can' t just foreclose master title and auction while SPA' s are signed and sitting on it. And buyers houses built on them... Cash and yield enhancement products and equity investments form approximately 29% and 14% of the total portfolio respectively. Glad to hear the 29% remains intact. The dream team in SG can utilise this to work out their grandious plans. The 14% equity-surely depleted like the share price of FH, or main market. We don' t even know what shares they hold. At least name us the Top 5 equity it contains. Vested with 600k shares now. Surely management owes its shareholders thees answers. OR BB' s like TR have privy and found it' s can of worms........ volvo125      ( Date: 02-Nov-2022 22:26) Posted: This is my objective thought on YFH. Ignore if you think it is trash especially when probably everyone (including myself, of course) here is flushed with frustration and anger because the price indeed has been mysteriously thrashed down by some unknown forces for some unknown reasons & hellip .   YFH had in 1H22 result release achieved a NPAT $136m and then went on to guide its FY22 NPAT at $220m. NAV per share stood at 1.07 as at 30Jun22.   The persistent and violent sell down to all time low 0.31 seems to suggest that the coy is broken with either being (1)  tainted with fraudulent investigations or (2)  met with a going concern such as an imminent default risk or (3)  expecting to incur huge FY22 net losses   It cannot be (1) because YFH was just spun off 5 months ago with a clean audited balance sheet and cash flow under the scrutiny of SGX approval. It also cannot be (2) because YFH is net cash with negligible s/t debt so the default risk is zero. So big Sellers and Shorts are likely betting YFH will miss its FY22 NPAT big time or worst still, incur a net FY22 loss due to the significant RMB devaluation against SGD/USD, higher NPL, weak China stock market & hellip . etc.   I have done a deeper analysis on YFH based on its 1H22 releases and projected its FY22 P& L and NAV per share. I believe YFH will hit its FY22 NPAT at $218~224m with NAV per share increase to 1.13 (at 90%SBB). Even if we were to factor in a further 10% impact on the 2H22 NPAT due to further US rate hikes of 0.75% in Nov and 0.5% in Dec, YFH FY22 NPAT will still hit ~$210m which is near to its target. The steep sell down to all time low 0.31 is fear mongering to the extreme.   I have yet to pick up anything fundamentally wrong with YFH except the market sentiment in general (Capital flights due to rising US interest rates) and the current China challenging economic and still ongoing covid zero conditions. So, to all the Longs, Steady.   The details are given below if you are interested to find out how the numbers are computed. Please note that the numbers are estimates at best based on opening and closing balances averages instead of actual monthly movement balances which are not available to the public. Also, the impact of RMB devaluation may also be mitigated by some forms of financial instrument hedges which professional fund and money managers such as YFH will know how to do. For the smaller segment non interest incomes, I will use the 1H22 as assumptions.   I am not a CPA or certified Public Accountant so if there is a brother here who is an accountant to validate my numbers or assumptions or blind spots or accounting treatments would be greatly appreciated. I certainly look forward to seeing YFH FY22 release in Feb23 to see how my crude projection compares.   1H22 is YFH latest release so it will form the baseline for our further analysis.   1H22 :-   NPAT $136m was achieved in 1H22 in spite of currency and financial market weakness :- -  RMB v SGD down 2.3% ( 4.71 to 4.82, 31Dec21~30Jun22), Adversely affected as SGD is the reporting currency. -  SGD v USD down 3% (1.35 to 1.39, 31Dec21~30Jun22) -  RMB v USD down 5.3% (6.36 to 6.7, 31Dec21~30Jun22), this will adversely affect the first tranche of 11% (~$480m) fund transfer to Sg in 1H22. -  100% China RMB portfolio on 1Jan22 to 89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 31Jun22. This 11% Sg USD portfolio can only be initiated after spin off in May so YFH was still on a major basis being exposed to RMB 2.3% devaluation against SGD for reporting purpose in 1H22, and on a minor basis to RMB 5.3% devaluation against USD on the 11% Sg portfolio or the reported SGD480m in USD denomination. The currency translation loss was likely 90%*4.44B*2% = ~$79m. -  fair value adjustment ($19m losses) to the PRC $633m listed equity investments portfolio in Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange due to weak financial market sentiment (non interest income). -  DI 70% ($3.5b) on 1Jan21 to DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22, this explained the lower interest income affecting the P& L in 1H22.   Now, let us attempt to construct the 2H22 P& L based on the known or extrapolated information below :-   2H22 :-   -  RMB v SGD down 6.6% (4.82 to 5.14, 30Jun22~1Nov22). RMB devaluation against SGD had further worsen by 3x the impact felt in 1H for reporting in SGD currency. -  SGD v USD down 2.2% (1.39 to 1.42, 30Jun22~1Nov22) -  RMB v USD down 8.2% (6.7 to 7.25, 30Jun22~1Nov22), this will adversely affect the transfer of second tranche 11% fund to Sg in 2H22. -  89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 30Jun22 to 78% China RMB v 22% Sg USD portfolio by 31Dec22. -   DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22 to DI 50% (est. $2.22b) by 31Dec22. Interest income will go lower than 1H22 and currency translation loss will increase to ~$150m (~6.5% RMB devaluation against SGD) and affecting the Bal Sht NAV. $1.75B DI will matured and ~$1.42B will be added to maintain DI at 50%. -  there will be further fair value adjustment losses (?) to the PRC listed equity portfolio due to the continuous weakness in the PRC stock markets. We will best assume a further -$19m fair value losses as in 1H22. -  We will also best assume the dividend income to remain steady at $7.6m -  The steady state historical returns (interest income) for DI is ~12% pa or ~3% per quarter or ~6% per half year. The average DI return in 1H21 was 190m/[(3438m+3461m)/2] = 5.5%, and the average DI return in 1H22 was 184m/[(3514m+2659m)/2] = 5.96%. We will assume the 2H22 DI return at (5.5+5.96)/2 = 5.75%. -  The average interest income in 2H22 = [(2.53B+2.2B)/2]*5.75% = $136m -  We will also assume the SG& A expenses similar to 1H22 on the high side at $15m. -  We assume no reversal or addition of allowance for credit or other losses and NPL stays at ~2% which is well covered by the 4.7% provisions ($123m) provided for the full amount of DI exposure. -  1H21 tax was 24%, 1H22 tax was 19.5%. We will assume an average tax rate of 20% with 22% of portfolio in SG. -  NPAT = [Interest income - non interest income losses & ndash expenses]*80% = [136-11-15]*80% = $88m -  FY22 NPAT = 136m+88m = $224m or 136m+(82m*93%) = $218m if we tag a ~7% currency translation loss from RMB/SGD in 2H22.   -  With 78% of portfolio in China (RMB) by 31Dec22, the currency translation loss = 0.78*4.44B*7% = $242m will affect reporting in SGD and will in turn adversely affected the NAV. SBB will counter this negative impact. -    Assume SBB at 90% done by 31Dec22 or 0.9*395*0.38 average buyback price = 355m shares or $135m. As at 31Oct22, YFH spent $98.94m to buy back 259.56m shares at 0.381 average price. -    NAV/share = (1H22NAV-355m SBB-currency translation loss+FY22 NPAT)/Outstanding shares = (4.226B-135-242+218)/(3950-355) = 1.13 before dividend being declared. -    NAV will fall from 4.226B to 4.067B but NAV per share will increase from 1.07 to 1.13.   Rate This Post:

 

Dear @Volvo125, again a cordial thank you for your fresh insights. This thread is more fundamental in nature, I beg your paron to post here. Although I am CPA trained, I will abstain from overanalysing your deep fundamental study of NTA & projected EPS of FH. For the simple fact of the big disparity (lets upgrade it to obscene) between its share (aka the public reading of its NTA) compared to your calculations. You' d agree the disparity is leaving only crumbs from its so called NTA.

As fellow investors, we have every reason to be concerned, without any clarity, we can only go by public related information disclosed of the conditions around them, note : around them. I am  concerned of their asset quality, hence we might well be basing calcs on figures that have hugely depleted. 

Again I repost below my confusion, over asset quality, and hope clued up ones like you and others can enlighten.....
-------------

30 June 2022      57% of the total portfolio
So these contain the micro loans to businesses, are these like banks where they hold a floating or fixed charge over its assets ? Or merely hold their title, in what form ? A fixed charge or merely caveat and transfer form signed ? Do they end up taking over the keys of the business ? What kind of businesses are all these, retail or wholesale, manufacturers or whatever ? Sounds like they will need some receivers or liquidators.    Their corporate loans are not a pile of FD' s that they can walk in to bank and claim, its a lot more convulated. If they are exiting this business and these borrowers are unable under these recession conditions to refinance, they might as well take FH to cleaners, default and " deem sold" land to FH, surely a big profit over their historical cost, which reflects as a huge NPL for FH.

Jiangsu province.  land title is held as collateral by the Group
Managing their cashflow and holding the land title (exactly what the bondholders and banks did with Evergrande). Seems like their funds went in as a Joint Venture. When sales collapse, or the buyers default, they are in the same boat as its developer. FH seems to be like a property developer in this case.  Again we only have faint info of this.    their land titles held on Jiangsu projects, they can' t just foreclose master title and auction while SPA' s are signed and sitting on it. And buyers houses built on them...

Cash and yield enhancement products and equity investments form approximately 29% and 14% of the total portfolio respectively.
Glad to hear the 29% remains intact. The dream team in SG can utilise this to work out their grandious plans. The 14% equity-surely depleted like the share price of FH, or main market. We don' t even know what shares they hold. At least name us the Top 5 equity it contains.

Vested with 600k shares now. Surely management owes its shareholders thees answers. OR BB' s like TR have privy and found it' s can of worms........

volvo125      ( Date: 02-Nov-2022 22:26) Posted: This is my objective thought on YFH. Ignore if you think it is trash especially when probably everyone (including myself, of course) here is flushed with frustration and anger because the price indeed has been mysteriously thrashed down by some unknown forces for some unknown reasons & hellip .   YFH had in 1H22 result release achieved a NPAT $136m and then went on to guide its FY22 NPAT at $220m. NAV per share stood at 1.07 as at 30Jun22.   The persistent and violent sell down to all time low 0.31 seems to suggest that the coy is broken with either being (1)  tainted with fraudulent investigations or (2)  met with a going concern such as an imminent default risk or (3)  expecting to incur huge FY22 net losses   It cannot be (1) because YFH was just spun off 5 months ago with a clean audited balance sheet and cash flow under the scrutiny of SGX approval. It also cannot be (2) because YFH is net cash with negligible s/t debt so the default risk is zero. So big Sellers and Shorts are likely betting YFH will miss its FY22 NPAT big time or worst still, incur a net FY22 loss due to the significant RMB devaluation against SGD/USD, higher NPL, weak China stock market & hellip . etc.   I have done a deeper analysis on YFH based on its 1H22 releases and projected its FY22 P& L and NAV per share. I believe YFH will hit its FY22 NPAT at $218~224m with NAV per share increase to 1.13 (at 90%SBB). Even if we were to factor in a further 10% impact on the 2H22 NPAT due to further US rate hikes of 0.75% in Nov and 0.5% in Dec, YFH FY22 NPAT will still hit ~$210m which is near to its target. The steep sell down to all time low 0.31 is fear mongering to the extreme.   I have yet to pick up anything fundamentally wrong with YFH except the market sentiment in general (Capital flights due to rising US interest rates) and the current China challenging economic and still ongoing covid zero conditions. So, to all the Longs, Steady.   The details are given below if you are interested to find out how the numbers are computed. Please note that the numbers are estimates at best based on opening and closing balances averages instead of actual monthly movement balances which are not available to the public. Also, the impact of RMB devaluation may also be mitigated by some forms of financial instrument hedges which professional fund and money managers such as YFH will know how to do. For the smaller segment non interest incomes, I will use the 1H22 as assumptions.   I am not a CPA or certified Public Accountant so if there is a brother here who is an accountant to validate my numbers or assumptions or blind spots or accounting treatments would be greatly appreciated. I certainly look forward to seeing YFH FY22 release in Feb23 to see how my crude projection compares.   1H22 is YFH latest release so it will form the baseline for our further analysis.   1H22 :-   NPAT $136m was achieved in 1H22 in spite of currency and financial market weakness :- -  RMB v SGD down 2.3% ( 4.71 to 4.82, 31Dec21~30Jun22), Adversely affected as SGD is the reporting currency. -  SGD v USD down 3% (1.35 to 1.39, 31Dec21~30Jun22) -  RMB v USD down 5.3% (6.36 to 6.7, 31Dec21~30Jun22), this will adversely affect the first tranche of 11% (~$480m) fund transfer to Sg in 1H22. -  100% China RMB portfolio on 1Jan22 to 89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 31Jun22. This 11% Sg USD portfolio can only be initiated after spin off in May so YFH was still on a major basis being exposed to RMB 2.3% devaluation against SGD for reporting purpose in 1H22, and on a minor basis to RMB 5.3% devaluation against USD on the 11% Sg portfolio or the reported SGD480m in USD denomination. The currency translation loss was likely 90%*4.44B*2% = ~$79m. -  fair value adjustment ($19m losses) to the PRC $633m listed equity investments portfolio in Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange due to weak financial market sentiment (non interest income). -  DI 70% ($3.5b) on 1Jan21 to DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22, this explained the lower interest income affecting the P& L in 1H22.   Now, let us attempt to construct the 2H22 P& L based on the known or extrapolated information below :-   2H22 :-   -  RMB v SGD down 6.6% (4.82 to 5.14, 30Jun22~1Nov22). RMB devaluation against SGD had further worsen by 3x the impact felt in 1H for reporting in SGD currency. -  SGD v USD down 2.2% (1.39 to 1.42, 30Jun22~1Nov22) -  RMB v USD down 8.2% (6.7 to 7.25, 30Jun22~1Nov22), this will adversely affect the transfer of second tranche 11% fund to Sg in 2H22. -  89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 30Jun22 to 78% China RMB v 22% Sg USD portfolio by 31Dec22. -   DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22 to DI 50% (est. $2.22b) by 31Dec22. Interest income will go lower than 1H22 and currency translation loss will increase to ~$150m (~6.5% RMB devaluation against SGD) and affecting the Bal Sht NAV. $1.75B DI will matured and ~$1.42B will be added to maintain DI at 50%. -  there will be further fair value adjustment losses (?) to the PRC listed equity portfolio due to the continuous weakness in the PRC stock markets. We will best assume a further -$19m fair value losses as in 1H22. -  We will also best assume the dividend income to remain steady at $7.6m -  The steady state historical returns (interest income) for DI is ~12% pa or ~3% per quarter or ~6% per half year. The average DI return in 1H21 was 190m/[(3438m+3461m)/2] = 5.5%, and the average DI return in 1H22 was 184m/[(3514m+2659m)/2] = 5.96%. We will assume the 2H22 DI return at (5.5+5.96)/2 = 5.75%. -  The average interest income in 2H22 = [(2.53B+2.2B)/2]*5.75% = $136m -  We will also assume the SG& A expenses similar to 1H22 on the high side at $15m. -  We assume no reversal or addition of allowance for credit or other losses and NPL stays at ~2% which is well covered by the 4.7% provisions ($123m) provided for the full amount of DI exposure. -  1H21 tax was 24%, 1H22 tax was 19.5%. We will assume an average tax rate of 20% with 22% of portfolio in SG. -  NPAT = [Interest income - non interest income losses & ndash expenses]*80% = [136-11-15]*80% = $88m -  FY22 NPAT = 136m+88m = $224m or 136m+(82m*93%) = $218m if we tag a ~7% currency translation loss from RMB/SGD in 2H22.   -  With 78% of portfolio in China (RMB) by 31Dec22, the currency translation loss = 0.78*4.44B*7% = $242m will affect reporting in SGD and will in turn adversely affected the NAV. SBB will counter this negative impact. -    Assume SBB at 90% done by 31Dec22 or 0.9*395*0.38 average buyback price = 355m shares or $135m. As at 31Oct22, YFH spent $98.94m to buy back 259.56m shares at 0.381 average price. -    NAV/share = (1H22NAV-355m SBB-currency translation loss+FY22 NPAT)/Outstanding shares = (4.226B-135-242+218)/(3950-355) = 1.13 before dividend being declared. -    NAV will fall from 4.226B to 4.067B but NAV per share will increase from 1.07 to 1.13.   Rate This Post:

 

china not opening yet....no eye see

 

@volvo125,
I also think YFH is still fundamentally sound though it will not hit its target returns in the first couple of years. Just not sure how far below target. So it is good to see your analysis.
Based on your estimates of FY22 NPAT of $218~224m and 3,595m remaining shares in public float, the estimated FY22 dividends per share is 2.43~2.49 cents. That is assuming coy does not pay out more than the minimum 40% of returns it has promised.
Good to keep all these in mind as we do not know whether share price will stay around current level or hit new lows.

 

TROW did not continue to sell YZJS, perhaps they are waiting for better price. As for YZJF, SBB has stopped as of now and the share price didn' t seem to be affected. We don' t know why SSB has stopped but share price wise, I think it will stay at current level until closer to 1st FY results. 

HVRRVH      ( Date: 23-Oct-2022 11:07) Posted: On hindsight, the management stopped buying back [I would think is temporarily], could well be that TROW has finished selling. In fact, TROW have started selling YZJS. In the days ahead, we can observe to see if they will continue selling [till finish all the holding/dip below 5%] or the sale of YZJS is one off. In any case, it is a good sign if such determined seller have nothing more to sell. I am also holding YZJS but I don' t think the impact, if indeed TROW wanted to sell out, will be as bad as it had on YZJF. Reason being YZJS has much bigger potential buyers base. It even hit 150m volume few days back, this is almost 50% of TROW' s remaining holding and if they really want to sell out, there are enough buyers to mop it up.

 

Such a detailed & clear analysis is the reason why I keep reading this forum.

volvo125      ( Date: 02-Nov-2022 22:26) Posted: This is my objective thought on YFH. Ignore if you think it is trash especially when probably everyone (including myself, of course) here is flushed with frustration and anger because the price indeed has been mysteriously thrashed down by some unknown forces for some unknown reasons & hellip .   YFH had in 1H22 result release achieved a NPAT $136m and then went on to guide its FY22 NPAT at $220m. NAV per share stood at 1.07 as at 30Jun22.   The persistent and violent sell down to all time low 0.31 seems to suggest that the coy is broken with either being (1)  tainted with fraudulent investigations or (2)  met with a going concern such as an imminent default risk or (3)  expecting to incur huge FY22 net losses   It cannot be (1) because YFH was just spun off 5 months ago with a clean audited balance sheet and cash flow under the scrutiny of SGX approval. It also cannot be (2) because YFH is net cash with negligible s/t debt so the default risk is zero. So big Sellers and Shorts are likely betting YFH will miss its FY22 NPAT big time or worst still, incur a net FY22 loss due to the significant RMB devaluation against SGD/USD, higher NPL, weak China stock market & hellip . etc.   I have done a deeper analysis on YFH based on its 1H22 releases and projected its FY22 P& L and NAV per share. I believe YFH will hit its FY22 NPAT at $218~224m with NAV per share increase to 1.13 (at 90%SBB). Even if we were to factor in a further 10% impact on the 2H22 NPAT due to further US rate hikes of 0.75% in Nov and 0.5% in Dec, YFH FY22 NPAT will still hit ~$210m which is near to its target. The steep sell down to all time low 0.31 is fear mongering to the extreme.   I have yet to pick up anything fundamentally wrong with YFH except the market sentiment in general (Capital flights due to rising US interest rates) and the current China challenging economic and still ongoing covid zero conditions. So, to all the Longs, Steady.   The details are given below if you are interested to find out how the numbers are computed. Please note that the numbers are estimates at best based on opening and closing balances averages instead of actual monthly movement balances which are not available to the public. Also, the impact of RMB devaluation may also be mitigated by some forms of financial instrument hedges which professional fund and money managers such as YFH will know how to do. For the smaller segment non interest incomes, I will use the 1H22 as assumptions.   I am not a CPA or certified Public Accountant so if there is a brother here who is an accountant to validate my numbers or assumptions or blind spots or accounting treatments would be greatly appreciated. I certainly look forward to seeing YFH FY22 release in Feb23 to see how my crude projection compares.   1H22 is YFH latest release so it will form the baseline for our further analysis.   1H22 :-   NPAT $136m was achieved in 1H22 in spite of currency and financial market weakness :- -  RMB v SGD down 2.3% ( 4.71 to 4.82, 31Dec21~30Jun22), Adversely affected as SGD is the reporting currency. -  SGD v USD down 3% (1.35 to 1.39, 31Dec21~30Jun22) -  RMB v USD down 5.3% (6.36 to 6.7, 31Dec21~30Jun22), this will adversely affect the first tranche of 11% (~$480m) fund transfer to Sg in 1H22. -  100% China RMB portfolio on 1Jan22 to 89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 31Jun22. This 11% Sg USD portfolio can only be initiated after spin off in May so YFH was still on a major basis being exposed to RMB 2.3% devaluation against SGD for reporting purpose in 1H22, and on a minor basis to RMB 5.3% devaluation against USD on the 11% Sg portfolio or the reported SGD480m in USD denomination. The currency translation loss was likely 90%*4.44B*2% = ~$79m. -  fair value adjustment ($19m losses) to the PRC $633m listed equity investments portfolio in Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange due to weak financial market sentiment (non interest income). -  DI 70% ($3.5b) on 1Jan21 to DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22, this explained the lower interest income affecting the P& L in 1H22.   Now, let us attempt to construct the 2H22 P& L based on the known or extrapolated information below :-   2H22 :-   -  RMB v SGD down 6.6% (4.82 to 5.14, 30Jun22~1Nov22). RMB devaluation against SGD had further worsen by 3x the impact felt in 1H for reporting in SGD currency. -  SGD v USD down 2.2% (1.39 to 1.42, 30Jun22~1Nov22) -  RMB v USD down 8.2% (6.7 to 7.25, 30Jun22~1Nov22), this will adversely affect the transfer of second tranche 11% fund to Sg in 2H22. -  89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 30Jun22 to 78% China RMB v 22% Sg USD portfolio by 31Dec22. -   DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22 to DI 50% (est. $2.22b) by 31Dec22. Interest income will go lower than 1H22 and currency translation loss will increase to ~$150m (~6.5% RMB devaluation against SGD) and affecting the Bal Sht NAV. $1.75B DI will matured and ~$1.42B will be added to maintain DI at 50%. -  there will be further fair value adjustment losses (?) to the PRC listed equity portfolio due to the continuous weakness in the PRC stock markets. We will best assume a further -$19m fair value losses as in 1H22. -  We will also best assume the dividend income to remain steady at $7.6m -  The steady state historical returns (interest income) for DI is ~12% pa or ~3% per quarter or ~6% per half year. The average DI return in 1H21 was 190m/[(3438m+3461m)/2] = 5.5%, and the average DI return in 1H22 was 184m/[(3514m+2659m)/2] = 5.96%. We will assume the 2H22 DI return at (5.5+5.96)/2 = 5.75%. -  The average interest income in 2H22 = [(2.53B+2.2B)/2]*5.75% = $136m -  We will also assume the SG& A expenses similar to 1H22 on the high side at $15m. -  We assume no reversal or addition of allowance for credit or other losses and NPL stays at ~2% which is well covered by the 4.7% provisions ($123m) provided for the full amount of DI exposure. -  1H21 tax was 24%, 1H22 tax was 19.5%. We will assume an average tax rate of 20% with 22% of portfolio in SG. -  NPAT = [Interest income - non interest income losses & ndash expenses]*80% = [136-11-15]*80% = $88m -  FY22 NPAT = 136m+88m = $224m or 136m+(82m*93%) = $218m if we tag a ~7% currency translation loss from RMB/SGD in 2H22.   -  With 78% of portfolio in China (RMB) by 31Dec22, the currency translation loss = 0.78*4.44B*7% = $242m will affect reporting in SGD and will in turn adversely affected the NAV. SBB will counter this negative impact. -    Assume SBB at 90% done by 31Dec22 or 0.9*395*0.38 average buyback price = 355m shares or $135m. As at 31Oct22, YFH spent $98.94m to buy back 259.56m shares at 0.381 average price. -    NAV/share = (1H22NAV-355m SBB-currency translation loss+FY22 NPAT)/Outstanding shares = (4.226B-135-242+218)/(3950-355) = 1.13 before dividend being declared. -    NAV will fall from 4.226B to 4.067B but NAV per share will increase from 1.07 to 1.13.   Rate This Post:

 

Thank you for sharing. Just hold the stocks for two to three years since it is down so much. No point to sell now for those who already vested. Hope we will be rewarded duly..

volvo125      ( Date: 02-Nov-2022 22:26) Posted: This is my objective thought on YFH. Ignore if you think it is trash especially when probably everyone (including myself, of course) here is flushed with frustration and anger because the price indeed has been mysteriously thrashed down by some unknown forces for some unknown reasons & hellip .   YFH had in 1H22 result release achieved a NPAT $136m and then went on to guide its FY22 NPAT at $220m. NAV per share stood at 1.07 as at 30Jun22.   The persistent and violent sell down to all time low 0.31 seems to suggest that the coy is broken with either being (1)  tainted with fraudulent investigations or (2)  met with a going concern such as an imminent default risk or (3)  expecting to incur huge FY22 net losses   It cannot be (1) because YFH was just spun off 5 months ago with a clean audited balance sheet and cash flow under the scrutiny of SGX approval. It also cannot be (2) because YFH is net cash with negligible s/t debt so the default risk is zero. So big Sellers and Shorts are likely betting YFH will miss its FY22 NPAT big time or worst still, incur a net FY22 loss due to the significant RMB devaluation against SGD/USD, higher NPL, weak China stock market & hellip . etc.   I have done a deeper analysis on YFH based on its 1H22 releases and projected its FY22 P& L and NAV per share. I believe YFH will hit its FY22 NPAT at $218~224m with NAV per share increase to 1.13 (at 90%SBB). Even if we were to factor in a further 10% impact on the 2H22 NPAT due to further US rate hikes of 0.75% in Nov and 0.5% in Dec, YFH FY22 NPAT will still hit ~$210m which is near to its target. The steep sell down to all time low 0.31 is fear mongering to the extreme.   I have yet to pick up anything fundamentally wrong with YFH except the market sentiment in general (Capital flights due to rising US interest rates) and the current China challenging economic and still ongoing covid zero conditions. So, to all the Longs, Steady.   The details are given below if you are interested to find out how the numbers are computed. Please note that the numbers are estimates at best based on opening and closing balances averages instead of actual monthly movement balances which are not available to the public. Also, the impact of RMB devaluation may also be mitigated by some forms of financial instrument hedges which professional fund and money managers such as YFH will know how to do. For the smaller segment non interest incomes, I will use the 1H22 as assumptions.   I am not a CPA or certified Public Accountant so if there is a brother here who is an accountant to validate my numbers or assumptions or blind spots or accounting treatments would be greatly appreciated. I certainly look forward to seeing YFH FY22 release in Feb23 to see how my crude projection compares.   1H22 is YFH latest release so it will form the baseline for our further analysis.   1H22 :-   NPAT $136m was achieved in 1H22 in spite of currency and financial market weakness :- -  RMB v SGD down 2.3% ( 4.71 to 4.82, 31Dec21~30Jun22), Adversely affected as SGD is the reporting currency. -  SGD v USD down 3% (1.35 to 1.39, 31Dec21~30Jun22) -  RMB v USD down 5.3% (6.36 to 6.7, 31Dec21~30Jun22), this will adversely affect the first tranche of 11% (~$480m) fund transfer to Sg in 1H22. -  100% China RMB portfolio on 1Jan22 to 89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 31Jun22. This 11% Sg USD portfolio can only be initiated after spin off in May so YFH was still on a major basis being exposed to RMB 2.3% devaluation against SGD for reporting purpose in 1H22, and on a minor basis to RMB 5.3% devaluation against USD on the 11% Sg portfolio or the reported SGD480m in USD denomination. The currency translation loss was likely 90%*4.44B*2% = ~$79m. -  fair value adjustment ($19m losses) to the PRC $633m listed equity investments portfolio in Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange due to weak financial market sentiment (non interest income). -  DI 70% ($3.5b) on 1Jan21 to DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22, this explained the lower interest income affecting the P& L in 1H22.   Now, let us attempt to construct the 2H22 P& L based on the known or extrapolated information below :-   2H22 :-   -  RMB v SGD down 6.6% (4.82 to 5.14, 30Jun22~1Nov22). RMB devaluation against SGD had further worsen by 3x the impact felt in 1H for reporting in SGD currency. -  SGD v USD down 2.2% (1.39 to 1.42, 30Jun22~1Nov22) -  RMB v USD down 8.2% (6.7 to 7.25, 30Jun22~1Nov22), this will adversely affect the transfer of second tranche 11% fund to Sg in 2H22. -  89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 30Jun22 to 78% China RMB v 22% Sg USD portfolio by 31Dec22. -   DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22 to DI 50% (est. $2.22b) by 31Dec22. Interest income will go lower than 1H22 and currency translation loss will increase to ~$150m (~6.5% RMB devaluation against SGD) and affecting the Bal Sht NAV. $1.75B DI will matured and ~$1.42B will be added to maintain DI at 50%. -  there will be further fair value adjustment losses (?) to the PRC listed equity portfolio due to the continuous weakness in the PRC stock markets. We will best assume a further -$19m fair value losses as in 1H22. -  We will also best assume the dividend income to remain steady at $7.6m -  The steady state historical returns (interest income) for DI is ~12% pa or ~3% per quarter or ~6% per half year. The average DI return in 1H21 was 190m/[(3438m+3461m)/2] = 5.5%, and the average DI return in 1H22 was 184m/[(3514m+2659m)/2] = 5.96%. We will assume the 2H22 DI return at (5.5+5.96)/2 = 5.75%. -  The average interest income in 2H22 = [(2.53B+2.2B)/2]*5.75% = $136m -  We will also assume the SG& A expenses similar to 1H22 on the high side at $15m. -  We assume no reversal or addition of allowance for credit or other losses and NPL stays at ~2% which is well covered by the 4.7% provisions ($123m) provided for the full amount of DI exposure. -  1H21 tax was 24%, 1H22 tax was 19.5%. We will assume an average tax rate of 20% with 22% of portfolio in SG. -  NPAT = [Interest income - non interest income losses & ndash expenses]*80% = [136-11-15]*80% = $88m -  FY22 NPAT = 136m+88m = $224m or 136m+(82m*93%) = $218m if we tag a ~7% currency translation loss from RMB/SGD in 2H22.   -  With 78% of portfolio in China (RMB) by 31Dec22, the currency translation loss = 0.78*4.44B*7% = $242m will affect reporting in SGD and will in turn adversely affected the NAV. SBB will counter this negative impact. -    Assume SBB at 90% done by 31Dec22 or 0.9*395*0.38 average buyback price = 355m shares or $135m. As at 31Oct22, YFH spent $98.94m to buy back 259.56m shares at 0.381 average price. -    NAV/share = (1H22NAV-355m SBB-currency translation loss+FY22 NPAT)/Outstanding shares = (4.226B-135-242+218)/(3950-355) = 1.13 before dividend being declared. -    NAV will fall from 4.226B to 4.067B but NAV per share will increase from 1.07 to 1.13.   Rate This Post:

 

Well said . Hope you were spot on. Thanks

volvo125      ( Date: 02-Nov-2022 22:26) Posted: This is my objective thought on YFH. Ignore if you think it is trash especially when probably everyone (including myself, of course) here is flushed with frustration and anger because the price indeed has been mysteriously thrashed down by some unknown forces for some unknown reasons & hellip .   YFH had in 1H22 result release achieved a NPAT $136m and then went on to guide its FY22 NPAT at $220m. NAV per share stood at 1.07 as at 30Jun22.   The persistent and violent sell down to all time low 0.31 seems to suggest that the coy is broken with either being (1)  tainted with fraudulent investigations or (2)  met with a going concern such as an imminent default risk or (3)  expecting to incur huge FY22 net losses   It cannot be (1) because YFH was just spun off 5 months ago with a clean audited balance sheet and cash flow under the scrutiny of SGX approval. It also cannot be (2) because YFH is net cash with negligible s/t debt so the default risk is zero. So big Sellers and Shorts are likely betting YFH will miss its FY22 NPAT big time or worst still, incur a net FY22 loss due to the significant RMB devaluation against SGD/USD, higher NPL, weak China stock market & hellip . etc.   I have done a deeper analysis on YFH based on its 1H22 releases and projected its FY22 P& L and NAV per share. I believe YFH will hit its FY22 NPAT at $218~224m with NAV per share increase to 1.13 (at 90%SBB). Even if we were to factor in a further 10% impact on the 2H22 NPAT due to further US rate hikes of 0.75% in Nov and 0.5% in Dec, YFH FY22 NPAT will still hit ~$210m which is near to its target. The steep sell down to all time low 0.31 is fear mongering to the extreme.   I have yet to pick up anything fundamentally wrong with YFH except the market sentiment in general (Capital flights due to rising US interest rates) and the current China challenging economic and still ongoing covid zero conditions. So, to all the Longs, Steady.   The details are given below if you are interested to find out how the numbers are computed. Please note that the numbers are estimates at best based on opening and closing balances averages instead of actual monthly movement balances which are not available to the public. Also, the impact of RMB devaluation may also be mitigated by some forms of financial instrument hedges which professional fund and money managers such as YFH will know how to do. For the smaller segment non interest incomes, I will use the 1H22 as assumptions.   I am not a CPA or certified Public Accountant so if there is a brother here who is an accountant to validate my numbers or assumptions or blind spots or accounting treatments would be greatly appreciated. I certainly look forward to seeing YFH FY22 release in Feb23 to see how my crude projection compares.   1H22 is YFH latest release so it will form the baseline for our further analysis.   1H22 :-   NPAT $136m was achieved in 1H22 in spite of currency and financial market weakness :- -  RMB v SGD down 2.3% ( 4.71 to 4.82, 31Dec21~30Jun22), Adversely affected as SGD is the reporting currency. -  SGD v USD down 3% (1.35 to 1.39, 31Dec21~30Jun22) -  RMB v USD down 5.3% (6.36 to 6.7, 31Dec21~30Jun22), this will adversely affect the first tranche of 11% (~$480m) fund transfer to Sg in 1H22. -  100% China RMB portfolio on 1Jan22 to 89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 31Jun22. This 11% Sg USD portfolio can only be initiated after spin off in May so YFH was still on a major basis being exposed to RMB 2.3% devaluation against SGD for reporting purpose in 1H22, and on a minor basis to RMB 5.3% devaluation against USD on the 11% Sg portfolio or the reported SGD480m in USD denomination. The currency translation loss was likely 90%*4.44B*2% = ~$79m. -  fair value adjustment ($19m losses) to the PRC $633m listed equity investments portfolio in Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange due to weak financial market sentiment (non interest income). -  DI 70% ($3.5b) on 1Jan21 to DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22, this explained the lower interest income affecting the P& L in 1H22.   Now, let us attempt to construct the 2H22 P& L based on the known or extrapolated information below :-   2H22 :-   -  RMB v SGD down 6.6% (4.82 to 5.14, 30Jun22~1Nov22). RMB devaluation against SGD had further worsen by 3x the impact felt in 1H for reporting in SGD currency. -  SGD v USD down 2.2% (1.39 to 1.42, 30Jun22~1Nov22) -  RMB v USD down 8.2% (6.7 to 7.25, 30Jun22~1Nov22), this will adversely affect the transfer of second tranche 11% fund to Sg in 2H22. -  89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 30Jun22 to 78% China RMB v 22% Sg USD portfolio by 31Dec22. -   DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22 to DI 50% (est. $2.22b) by 31Dec22. Interest income will go lower than 1H22 and currency translation loss will increase to ~$150m (~6.5% RMB devaluation against SGD) and affecting the Bal Sht NAV. $1.75B DI will matured and ~$1.42B will be added to maintain DI at 50%. -  there will be further fair value adjustment losses (?) to the PRC listed equity portfolio due to the continuous weakness in the PRC stock markets. We will best assume a further -$19m fair value losses as in 1H22. -  We will also best assume the dividend income to remain steady at $7.6m -  The steady state historical returns (interest income) for DI is ~12% pa or ~3% per quarter or ~6% per half year. The average DI return in 1H21 was 190m/[(3438m+3461m)/2] = 5.5%, and the average DI return in 1H22 was 184m/[(3514m+2659m)/2] = 5.96%. We will assume the 2H22 DI return at (5.5+5.96)/2 = 5.75%. -  The average interest income in 2H22 = [(2.53B+2.2B)/2]*5.75% = $136m -  We will also assume the SG& A expenses similar to 1H22 on the high side at $15m. -  We assume no reversal or addition of allowance for credit or other losses and NPL stays at ~2% which is well covered by the 4.7% provisions ($123m) provided for the full amount of DI exposure. -  1H21 tax was 24%, 1H22 tax was 19.5%. We will assume an average tax rate of 20% with 22% of portfolio in SG. -  NPAT = [Interest income - non interest income losses & ndash expenses]*80% = [136-11-15]*80% = $88m -  FY22 NPAT = 136m+88m = $224m or 136m+(82m*93%) = $218m if we tag a ~7% currency translation loss from RMB/SGD in 2H22.   -  With 78% of portfolio in China (RMB) by 31Dec22, the currency translation loss = 0.78*4.44B*7% = $242m will affect reporting in SGD and will in turn adversely affected the NAV. SBB will counter this negative impact. -    Assume SBB at 90% done by 31Dec22 or 0.9*395*0.38 average buyback price = 355m shares or $135m. As at 31Oct22, YFH spent $98.94m to buy back 259.56m shares at 0.381 average price. -    NAV/share = (1H22NAV-355m SBB-currency translation loss+FY22 NPAT)/Outstanding shares = (4.226B-135-242+218)/(3950-355) = 1.13 before dividend being declared. -    NAV will fall from 4.226B to 4.067B but NAV per share will increase from 1.07 to 1.13.   Rate This Post:

 

This is my objective thought on YFH. Ignore if you think it is trash especially when probably everyone (including myself, of course) here is flushed with frustration and anger because the price indeed has been mysteriously thrashed down by some unknown forces for some unknown reasons & hellip .   YFH had in 1H22 result release achieved a NPAT $136m and then went on to guide its FY22 NPAT at $220m. NAV per share stood at 1.07 as at 30Jun22.   The persistent and violent sell down to all time low 0.31 seems to suggest that the coy is broken with either being (1)  tainted with fraudulent investigations or (2)  met with a going concern such as an imminent default risk or (3)  expecting to incur huge FY22 net losses   It cannot be (1) because YFH was just spun off 5 months ago with a clean audited balance sheet and cash flow under the scrutiny of SGX approval. It also cannot be (2) because YFH is net cash with negligible s/t debt so the default risk is zero. So big Sellers and Shorts are likely betting YFH will miss its FY22 NPAT big time or worst still, incur a net FY22 loss due to the significant RMB devaluation against SGD/USD, higher NPL, weak China stock market & hellip . etc.   I have done a deeper analysis on YFH based on its 1H22 releases and projected its FY22 P& L and NAV per share. I believe YFH will hit its FY22 NPAT at $218~224m with NAV per share increase to 1.13 (at 90%SBB). Even if we were to factor in a further 10% impact on the 2H22 NPAT due to further US rate hikes of 0.75% in Nov and 0.5% in Dec, YFH FY22 NPAT will still hit ~$210m which is near to its target. The steep sell down to all time low 0.31 is fear mongering to the extreme.   I have yet to pick up anything fundamentally wrong with YFH except the market sentiment in general (Capital flights due to rising US interest rates) and the current China challenging economic and still ongoing covid zero conditions. So, to all the Longs, Steady.   The details are given below if you are interested to find out how the numbers are computed. Please note that the numbers are estimates at best based on opening and closing balances averages instead of actual monthly movement balances which are not available to the public. Also, the impact of RMB devaluation may also be mitigated by some forms of financial instrument hedges which professional fund and money managers such as YFH will know how to do. For the smaller segment non interest incomes, I will use the 1H22 as assumptions.   I am not a CPA or certified Public Accountant so if there is a brother here who is an accountant to validate my numbers or assumptions or blind spots or accounting treatments would be greatly appreciated. I certainly look forward to seeing YFH FY22 release in Feb23 to see how my crude projection compares.   1H22 is YFH latest release so it will form the baseline for our further analysis.   1H22 :-   NPAT $136m was achieved in 1H22 in spite of currency and financial market weakness :- -  RMB v SGD down 2.3% ( 4.71 to 4.82, 31Dec21~30Jun22), Adversely affected as SGD is the reporting currency. -  SGD v USD down 3% (1.35 to 1.39, 31Dec21~30Jun22) -  RMB v USD down 5.3% (6.36 to 6.7, 31Dec21~30Jun22), this will adversely affect the first tranche of 11% (~$480m) fund transfer to Sg in 1H22. -  100% China RMB portfolio on 1Jan22 to 89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 31Jun22. This 11% Sg USD portfolio can only be initiated after spin off in May so YFH was still on a major basis being exposed to RMB 2.3% devaluation against SGD for reporting purpose in 1H22, and on a minor basis to RMB 5.3% devaluation against USD on the 11% Sg portfolio or the reported SGD480m in USD denomination. The currency translation loss was likely 90%*4.44B*2% = ~$79m. -  fair value adjustment ($19m losses) to the PRC $633m listed equity investments portfolio in Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange due to weak financial market sentiment (non interest income). -  DI 70% ($3.5b) on 1Jan21 to DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22, this explained the lower interest income affecting the P& L in 1H22.   Now, let us attempt to construct the 2H22 P& L based on the known or extrapolated information below :-   2H22 :-   -  RMB v SGD down 6.6% (4.82 to 5.14, 30Jun22~1Nov22). RMB devaluation against SGD had further worsen by 3x the impact felt in 1H for reporting in SGD currency. -  SGD v USD down 2.2% (1.39 to 1.42, 30Jun22~1Nov22) -  RMB v USD down 8.2% (6.7 to 7.25, 30Jun22~1Nov22), this will adversely affect the transfer of second tranche 11% fund to Sg in 2H22. -  89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 30Jun22 to 78% China RMB v 22% Sg USD portfolio by 31Dec22. -   DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22 to DI 50% (est. $2.22b) by 31Dec22. Interest income will go lower than 1H22 and currency translation loss will increase to ~$150m (~6.5% RMB devaluation against SGD) and affecting the Bal Sht NAV. $1.75B DI will matured and ~$1.42B will be added to maintain DI at 50%. -  there will be further fair value adjustment losses (?) to the PRC listed equity portfolio due to the continuous weakness in the PRC stock markets. We will best assume a further -$19m fair value losses as in 1H22. -  We will also best assume the dividend income to remain steady at $7.6m -  The steady state historical returns (interest income) for DI is ~12% pa or ~3% per quarter or ~6% per half year. The average DI return in 1H21 was 190m/[(3438m+3461m)/2] = 5.5%, and the average DI return in 1H22 was 184m/[(3514m+2659m)/2] = 5.96%. We will assume the 2H22 DI return at (5.5+5.96)/2 = 5.75%. -  The average interest income in 2H22 = [(2.53B+2.2B)/2]*5.75% = $136m -  We will also assume the SG& A expenses similar to 1H22 on the high side at $15m. -  We assume no reversal or addition of allowance for credit or other losses and NPL stays at ~2% which is well covered by the 4.7% provisions ($123m) provided for the full amount of DI exposure. -  1H21 tax was 24%, 1H22 tax was 19.5%. We will assume an average tax rate of 20% with 22% of portfolio in SG. -  NPAT = [Interest income - non interest income losses & ndash expenses]*80% = [136-11-15]*80% = $88m -  FY22 NPAT = 136m+88m = $224m or 136m+(82m*93%) = $218m if we tag a ~7% currency translation loss from RMB/SGD in 2H22.   -  With 78% of portfolio in China (RMB) by 31Dec22, the currency translation loss = 0.78*4.44B*7% = $242m will affect reporting in SGD and will in turn adversely affected the NAV. SBB will counter this negative impact. -    Assume SBB at 90% done by 31Dec22 or 0.9*395*0.38 average buyback price = 355m shares or $135m. As at 31Oct22, YFH spent $98.94m to buy back 259.56m shares at 0.381 average price. -    NAV/share = (1H22NAV-355m SBB-currency translation loss+FY22 NPAT)/Outstanding shares = (4.226B-135-242+218)/(3950-355) = 1.13 before dividend being declared. -    NAV will fall from 4.226B to 4.067B but NAV per share will increase from 1.07 to 1.13.

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On hindsight, the management stopped buying back [I would think is temporarily], could well be that TROW has finished selling. In fact, TROW have started selling YZJS. In the days ahead, we can observe to see if they will continue selling [till finish all the holding/dip below 5%] or the sale of YZJS is one off. In any case, it is a good sign if such determined seller have nothing more to sell. I am also holding YZJS but I don' t think the impact, if indeed TROW wanted to sell out, will be as bad as it had on YZJF. Reason being YZJS has much bigger potential buyers base. It even hit 150m volume few days back, this is almost 50% of TROW' s remaining holding and if they really want to sell out, there are enough buyers to mop it up. 

 

Almost same price as 2 weeks ago, has YZJF found the bottom? Personally I won' t bet on it but over the last couple of weeks, the trading volume has thinned. Accordingly, yesterday the company also didn' t buy back its shares. I think after selling/short sell YZJF for the longest time, the sellers have many alternative now, chiefly the reits, which see at least 15-20% drop in unit prices in some cases. I have some fund on standby in case YZJF' s share price ' collapse' , but I am also a reits investor and found some reit ETF at very attractive price now. I know I am trying to target the ' bottom' for both YZJF and the reit ETF I am eyeing, best case scenario is YZJF' s price stable till 1st FY results so that I can deploy some fund to buy the reit ETF. 

 

Thanks much @volvo. Enlightening that we balance fundamentals (where I am trained and favour) to technical to actual live.

All said, this share listed with expectation of close to 1.08 NTA, disappointed (slightly) at 69c opening. Fell all the way to todays 36c.
If not for the SBB and its disclosed grandious ideas & staff, it would be 28c today heading for 20c soon...... the record volumes daily show its a nicely traded bitcoin counter.

I let the share price and divs do the talking for now.....
Will come back to study its fundamentals after 3 years.

volvo125      ( Date: 11-Oct-2022 19:05) Posted: I can understand your frustration ... I believe all the Long investors would have varying degree of such sour frustrations when the value of their investments have continue to remain in a steeply depressed state.  Regardless why TR exited shortly and abruptly after YFH spin off and in turn causing this deep selldown mayhem, we probably need to stay objective as to what YFH really is as a Listco. 1)  The DI business is not an ah Long business as YFH has the legitimate licence from the Chinese government to operate. The net interest come is only ~3% per quarter and ~12% pa based on 1.3x collateral coverage at amortised cost and then legitimately reported and audited by E& Y before submission up to the Chinese and SG govts for taxations. Ah Long business will probably charge 10~20% per month with zero collateral at underground with no audited books for govt taxation. 2)  The YFH board (including the advisor) is packed with former Snr Directors from MAS, SGX and GIC who are prominent heavy weights in the finance and investment sectors. These prominent finance and investment figure heads would never want to associate with a coy with even the slightest ah Loong flavour that will tarnish their reputations.. 3)  All the previous and also ongoing appointments and hiring of highly qualified candidates in the investment and finance sectors are likely necessary because YFH is conducting a Investment and Wealth management business. Their target partners are governments and profesional financial institutions and their clients are all HNWI or UHNWI. All these existing and potential stakeholders and clients will want only to deal with highly qualified representives with strong reputations and networks. 4)  YFH is a spin off from YZJ so the 3.95B float is an involuntary given and not a choice. It was unfortunate that TR dumped out 295m shares earlier and Vanguard is highly likely doing so with its 95m since late Sep. Captial flights back to US are very real problems happening now in the world in the face of conttinuing steep rate hikes. Both TR and Vanguard and US angmoh funds. 5)    The insider holdings in YFH and YZJ is similar as YFH was spun off from YZJ. YFH will need to pay dividend to Ren 21% and Lido Point 10% (the employee Trust set up by WangD). Having tabled out all the above objective observations on YFH, it does not mean I am immuned to the current persistent depressive state of my investment in YFH. I guess we all just need to have more patience. I continue to see a deeply discounted gem waiting to regain its value. When Loke took over AEM in ~2014/15, it took ~ 3years+ for the coy to go through very rough and recurring roller coater rides before exploding up in 2017 (AEM 1st explosion was in 2017, then crashed back in 2018 trade war, and 2nd explosion again in late 2019). I rode this first steep AEM roller coaster then for 3year+ so this ~5 month ride with YFH is still a relatively short though unpleasant experience. emailpeter      ( Date: 11-Oct-2022 17:22) Posted: @volvo, thanks for your reply, albeit not enlightening to the (whatever remaining) blind faith I have in this FH. To the least, I made some on SH.  I somehow can' t see the direction of this company. Even in long term. Yes, they did greedily keep 9 yrs of profits, investing in China Ah Long, manifesting into what FH is now. But outside of China, it seems a " wayang kulit" " stageshow" they are projecting to keep our confidence. All these baseless announcements of appointments, lip servicing buttering up each other......We might end up with a huge (huge) payroll and a drop in revenue. Double whammy. Ren has kept the public float far too high, let alone the type of shareholders are not solid holders, they rent out their shares and their clients' shares to be shorted to pits. Good stable listed companies do not possess these kind of vulture shareholders. Look at the madness volume for this small company. Like I said before, Ren doesn' t care 2 hoots about share price. He monitors it 2x per year, or when his golf friends grumble to him. SH has better prospects, it has to pay divs to reward himself, and his 10% employee fund. And he has no more avenue to tuck it away on more Ah Long etc.

 

Why is the share getting hammered down ? Friend asked to take a small interest but fluctuation is pretty wild

 

listed only for a few months. so far the management track record is super good.
company is holding mostly cash in millions with very little exposure to equities.
just last month the buying power of their cash has increased by 10%.
is this just luck or wisdom and knowledge that the management has demonstrated?
it is a fund that is closed end so no redemption demand just sell down of listed shares. so buy back is good to buy at a discount. if it has been redemption then the goodness of the holding cash will have to be paid out. that i think maybe nearer to a $1 rather then below 40cents.
it is a sale by some who has fear or creating fear. don t one buy when there is a sale of good things? dyodd

 

He has to build good image for his new team.

volvo125      ( Date: 11-Oct-2022 23:03) Posted: Toe increased the SBB back to a more encouraging 3m today ... hopefully he can maintain at least this pace ... pasttime      ( Date: 11-Oct-2022 22:54) Posted: share buy back continue. good more value created for shareholders.  buy small small hold long long.

 

Toe increased the SBB back to a more encouraging 3m today ... hopefully he can maintain at least this pace ...

pasttime      ( Date: 11-Oct-2022 22:54) Posted: share buy back continue. good more value created for shareholders.  buy small small hold long long.