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Latest Forum Topics / YZJ Fin Hldg    Last:0.24    +0.005  Post Reply
Will it Break 10cents again???
pursuer76
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07-Dec-2022 10:46     
 
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 Alert Admin 		From a layman' s perspective, the price is already heavily discounted (i.e. from listing price of $0.69 to the current $0.34). If they can list at $0.69, the company must be worth that much or at least around that range. If your company is worth $0.10, I don' t think SGX will allow it to list at $0.69. Since YZJSH decided to spin-off and form YZJFH which received 60% of YZJSH' s asset, I don' t think the management is so dumb to let the business fail. They will be the ultimate losers. With the continuous hiring of talents, I suppose, their profitability should goes up once the economy recovers. I reckon they just chose the wrong time to spun off and probably without building a robust foundation for the business prior to the spin-off. Just my personal perspective  smiley
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soeteono
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07-Dec-2022 09:11     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Looks like market has discounted this negative news .
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john1703
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07-Dec-2022 08:43     
 
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 Alert Admin 		I saw CIMB report and quote the following. It seems it is delaying the transfer till end-January 2023.

" At its listing in April, YZJFH had targeted to transfer $1 billion to Singapore by end-FY2022. Tan and Lim think some $610 million has been transferred as at end-3QFY2022, including $99 million spent on share buybacks, and transfer of the remaining sum has been delayed to end-January 2023."
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pasttime
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07-Dec-2022 07:25     
 
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 Alert Admin 		sgdcny exchange rate drop from end jun 4.8 to end sep 4.96 and continue to drop to 5.23 on 28 nov.
reversal is happening and likely to move towards 4.6 in future as china changes their covid-19 measures. they now call it flu. so current write down due to excahnge rate will be write back later.just hope they cement the 50/50 curency split slowly to max the recovery of cny.  current market wager seems to be more on jpy recovery.
remember that they hold a lot of cash and as equities recover they just need to put money to work and that will give good return later. just my wishful thinking.
dyodd
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Amateurinvestor
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07-Dec-2022 06:50     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Nice analysis bro Volvo125, now the big question is whether the current price is reflective of this negative piece of news 
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vicloo
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07-Dec-2022 06:37     
 
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 Alert Admin 		My 2cent is hold and wait until all dusts settle down if you want to invest long term on it. Don't add more.

OR just cut loss and move on.

Maxgrow68      ( Date: 07-Dec-2022 03:37) Posted:

Wow!  Thanks vm Bro for time and effort in sharing your analysis and interpretation of the 3Q report.
Based on your rework numbers and interpretation, it appears the financial condition of YFH has deterioriated
significantly overall !!
Hmmm....what the next step for investors?

 

volvo125      ( Date: 07-Dec-2022 02:16) Posted:

Based on the indicative numbers quoted in the 3Q report, I shall attempt to rework the crude P& L and Balance Sheet based on the indicative numbers given in the 3Q :-
 
A)    Summary

a.    YFH likely registered 3Q NPAT at ~$61m.  Steady state NPAT was ~$320m based on pure DI and prior to spin off, so average quarterly NPAT = 320 / 4 = ~$80m.
b)    RMB devaluation against SGD and NPL provision almost wiped out the 206m shares SBB benefits on Nav. 3Q NPAT lifted the Nav back up to 1.0923.
c)    CIMB issued an update but the report was still strangely using 3951m shares as reference. The P& L and Balance sheet were also not duly updated, Please read with caveat.  
d)    $777m NPL seems scary but only $14.8m seems really bad that needs provisions and these DIs are backed by 1.3x collaterals. I&rsquo m not expert so unable to comment on the recovery process further.
e).    This work paper relies very much on the Nav 1.092 provided by YFH and it is reasonable to assume this nav 1.092 must be based on the number of shares that were outstanding as at 30Sep2022, which was worked out to be 3744m. If YFH was still (erroneously) using the 3937m shares outstanding as at 30Jun2022 (just like CIMB was still using 3951m shares to update its report), then the 3Q report is garbage, and this work paper will also be garbage.
f)      My accounting interpretations may not be completely correct, and there could be computation errors. Any bro could correct the numbers if you have accounting reasons to amend.
 
B)    Workings

1.  YFH Balance Sheet :- Nav increased from 107.45 to 109.23.

1a) Nav

+    Old Nav 1.0745 was referenced to 3937m shares as at 30Jun2022. Net Asset was $4230m.
+    Latest Nav 1.0923 in the 3Q report is referenced to 3744m shares as at 30Sep2022. YFH spent ~$79.62m to SBB 206m shares as at 30Sep2022 ( You will get these numbers if you use an excel worksheet to tabulate all the SBB quantities and values records until 30Sep2022 ).
+    Latest Net Asset = 1.0923 * 3744 = $4089m as at 30Sep2022.
+    The theoretical Nav per share of YFH as at 30Sep2022 based on just the SBB exercise alone should equate to (4230m &ndash 79.62m) / 3744 = 1.1085, assuming there is no RMB/SGD devaluation, net losses, or other unforeseen liabilities such as the one time deferred tax liabilities of undistributed income due to the spin off exercise.
+    So there is actually a drop in Nav = 1.1085 &ndash 1.0923 = 0.01624 per share or ~$61m (down) after accounting for the SBB effect.
+    Please note that latest Nav 1.0923 or Net Asset $4089m in the balance sheet is already net of SBB, RMB devaluation, NPL provisions and also the net profit/loss embedded in kinds in the current and non current assets.
 
1b)  RMB vs SGD ( Impact on reporting )

+    RMB down ~2.9% against SGD (exchange rate 4.82 on 30Jun2022 vs 4.96 on 30Sep2022)
+    $511m or 12% of group asset was still reflected in the balance sheet as at 30Sep2022 for offshore deployment. This should exclude the $79.62m already spent on SBB.
+    Net asset in RMB converted to SGD for reporting = 4089 &ndash 511 = $3578m, which included a translation loss of RMB to SGD of 2.9% = (3578 / 0.971) * 0.029 = ~$107m
 
1c) AUM

Note : AUM is not same as Nav. AUM is all the assets that the coy could deploy to earn incomes. Nav is simply total assets net of total liabilities.  
+    Net NPL is $762.7m or 31.5% of total DI. Total DI = 762.7 / 0.315 = $2421m
+    DI is 56% of total portfolio.
+    Hence Total portfolio or AUM = 2421 / 0.56 = $4323m as at 30Sep2022, which is net of the $79.62m spent on SBB, the $14.8m provision for NPL and fair value adjustments.
+    AUM was $4440m as at 30Jun2022.
+    There is a drop in AUM = 4440 &ndash 4323 = ~$117m, which is likely due mainly to the RMB devaluation against SGD.
 
My Interpretation :-

+    Assuming no other significant impact on the balance sheet except the (1) SBB, (2) RMB/SGD exchange rate, (3) NPL provision, (4) 3Q earning.
+    Theoretical Nav with SBB as at 30Sep2022 = 1.1084 * 3744m = $4150m (after SBB 206m shares)
+    Actual Nav as at 30Sep2022 in 3Q report = 1.0923 * 3744m = $4089m is net of SBB, RMB devaluation, NPL provision and 3Q earning.
+    There is a drop in Nav = 4150 &ndash 4089 = $61m, BUT Nav should drop more than $61m due to the $107m RMB devaluation loss and $14.8m NPL provisions, UNLESS there is a net gain that reduced this impact.
+    With SBB already accounted for, actual Nav should drop or increase by   (-107m) + (-14.8m) + (net earning)
+    Hence 4089m = 4150m &ndash 107m &ndash 14.8m   + net earning
+    Therefore Net earning in 3Q = $60.8m  

 


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Maxgrow68
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07-Dec-2022 03:37     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Wow!  Thanks vm Bro for time and effort in sharing your analysis and interpretation of the 3Q report.
Based on your rework numbers and interpretation, it appears the financial condition of YFH has deterioriated
significantly overall !!
Hmmm....what the next step for investors?

 

volvo125      ( Date: 07-Dec-2022 02:16) Posted:

Based on the indicative numbers quoted in the 3Q report, I shall attempt to rework the crude P& L and Balance Sheet based on the indicative numbers given in the 3Q :-
 
A)    Summary

a.    YFH likely registered 3Q NPAT at ~$61m.  Steady state NPAT was ~$320m based on pure DI and prior to spin off, so average quarterly NPAT = 320 / 4 = ~$80m.
b)    RMB devaluation against SGD and NPL provision almost wiped out the 206m shares SBB benefits on Nav. 3Q NPAT lifted the Nav back up to 1.0923.
c)    CIMB issued an update but the report was still strangely using 3951m shares as reference. The P& L and Balance sheet were also not duly updated, Please read with caveat.  
d)    $777m NPL seems scary but only $14.8m seems really bad that needs provisions and these DIs are backed by 1.3x collaterals. I&rsquo m not expert so unable to comment on the recovery process further.
e).    This work paper relies very much on the Nav 1.092 provided by YFH and it is reasonable to assume this nav 1.092 must be based on the number of shares that were outstanding as at 30Sep2022, which was worked out to be 3744m. If YFH was still (erroneously) using the 3937m shares outstanding as at 30Jun2022 (just like CIMB was still using 3951m shares to update its report), then the 3Q report is garbage, and this work paper will also be garbage.
f)      My accounting interpretations may not be completely correct, and there could be computation errors. Any bro could correct the numbers if you have accounting reasons to amend.
 
B)    Workings

1.  YFH Balance Sheet :- Nav increased from 107.45 to 109.23.

1a) Nav

+    Old Nav 1.0745 was referenced to 3937m shares as at 30Jun2022. Net Asset was $4230m.
+    Latest Nav 1.0923 in the 3Q report is referenced to 3744m shares as at 30Sep2022. YFH spent ~$79.62m to SBB 206m shares as at 30Sep2022 ( You will get these numbers if you use an excel worksheet to tabulate all the SBB quantities and values records until 30Sep2022 ).
+    Latest Net Asset = 1.0923 * 3744 = $4089m as at 30Sep2022.
+    The theoretical Nav per share of YFH as at 30Sep2022 based on just the SBB exercise alone should equate to (4230m &ndash 79.62m) / 3744 = 1.1085, assuming there is no RMB/SGD devaluation, net losses, or other unforeseen liabilities such as the one time deferred tax liabilities of undistributed income due to the spin off exercise.
+    So there is actually a drop in Nav = 1.1085 &ndash 1.0923 = 0.01624 per share or ~$61m (down) after accounting for the SBB effect.
+    Please note that latest Nav 1.0923 or Net Asset $4089m in the balance sheet is already net of SBB, RMB devaluation, NPL provisions and also the net profit/loss embedded in kinds in the current and non current assets.
 
1b)  RMB vs SGD ( Impact on reporting )

+    RMB down ~2.9% against SGD (exchange rate 4.82 on 30Jun2022 vs 4.96 on 30Sep2022)
+    $511m or 12% of group asset was still reflected in the balance sheet as at 30Sep2022 for offshore deployment. This should exclude the $79.62m already spent on SBB.
+    Net asset in RMB converted to SGD for reporting = 4089 &ndash 511 = $3578m, which included a translation loss of RMB to SGD of 2.9% = (3578 / 0.971) * 0.029 = ~$107m
 
1c) AUM

Note : AUM is not same as Nav. AUM is all the assets that the coy could deploy to earn incomes. Nav is simply total assets net of total liabilities.  
+    Net NPL is $762.7m or 31.5% of total DI. Total DI = 762.7 / 0.315 = $2421m
+    DI is 56% of total portfolio.
+    Hence Total portfolio or AUM = 2421 / 0.56 = $4323m as at 30Sep2022, which is net of the $79.62m spent on SBB, the $14.8m provision for NPL and fair value adjustments.
+    AUM was $4440m as at 30Jun2022.
+    There is a drop in AUM = 4440 &ndash 4323 = ~$117m, which is likely due mainly to the RMB devaluation against SGD.
 
My Interpretation :-

+    Assuming no other significant impact on the balance sheet except the (1) SBB, (2) RMB/SGD exchange rate, (3) NPL provision, (4) 3Q earning.
+    Theoretical Nav with SBB as at 30Sep2022 = 1.1084 * 3744m = $4150m (after SBB 206m shares)
+    Actual Nav as at 30Sep2022 in 3Q report = 1.0923 * 3744m = $4089m is net of SBB, RMB devaluation, NPL provision and 3Q earning.
+    There is a drop in Nav = 4150 &ndash 4089 = $61m, BUT Nav should drop more than $61m due to the $107m RMB devaluation loss and $14.8m NPL provisions, UNLESS there is a net gain that reduced this impact.
+    With SBB already accounted for, actual Nav should drop or increase by   (-107m) + (-14.8m) + (net earning)
+    Hence 4089m = 4150m &ndash 107m &ndash 14.8m   + net earning
+    Therefore Net earning in 3Q = $60.8m  

 

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emailpeter
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07-Dec-2022 03:23     
 
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 Alert Admin
I will do some estimates based on your projections. Feel free correct my assumptions.
 
Q1+Q2      136
Q3 (e)          61
Q4 (e)          55
NPAT        252m
 
O/S Shares          3950
Less SBB (90%)   355
Net O/S              3595m
 
Est EPS 252/3595 = $0.07
Est PER (0.34)       = 4.8x
Est Div% (40%)      = 0.028 / 0.34 = 8.2%
Effective Div%        = 0.028 / 0.45 = 6.2% *
* each investor can base on own ave cost. In my case its $0.45.
 
" d)    $777m NPL seems scary but only $14.8m seems really bad that needs provisions and these DIs are backed by 1.3x collaterals. I' m not expert so unable to comment on the recovery process further."
 
I' m also not an expert on this area, CIMB' s mention of 2.3x is taken at book values by FH, it would be a struggle to make accurate liquidation valuations of each land parcel owing to this volatile (downward) market. Furthermore, that ratio is on a grand total basis, in all likelihood the NPL loans would naturally cover the weaker land parcels, they might well be in major loan deficit. The plus would be most of the loan would have been paid back, leading to small amounts at NPL. We are just blindly guessing here.
 
I can' t see how they can make full recovery of all maturing loans, and not any rollovers. Credit to marginal companies are the hardest at this recessionary juncture.
 
It can be safely assumed, any large impending writeoff of NPL' s will be a huge major hit to yearend NPAT.
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volvo125
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07-Dec-2022 02:16     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Based on the indicative numbers quoted in the 3Q report, I shall attempt to rework the crude P& L and Balance Sheet based on the indicative numbers given in the 3Q :-
 
A)    Summary

a.    YFH likely registered 3Q NPAT at ~$61m.  Steady state NPAT was ~$320m based on pure DI and prior to spin off, so average quarterly NPAT = 320 / 4 = ~$80m.
b)    RMB devaluation against SGD and NPL provision almost wiped out the 206m shares SBB benefits on Nav. 3Q NPAT lifted the Nav back up to 1.0923.
c)    CIMB issued an update but the report was still strangely using 3951m shares as reference. The P& L and Balance sheet were also not duly updated, Please read with caveat.  
d)    $777m NPL seems scary but only $14.8m seems really bad that needs provisions and these DIs are backed by 1.3x collaterals. I&rsquo m not expert so unable to comment on the recovery process further.
e).    This work paper relies very much on the Nav 1.092 provided by YFH and it is reasonable to assume this nav 1.092 must be based on the number of shares that were outstanding as at 30Sep2022, which was worked out to be 3744m. If YFH was still (erroneously) using the 3937m shares outstanding as at 30Jun2022 (just like CIMB was still using 3951m shares to update its report), then the 3Q report is garbage, and this work paper will also be garbage.
f)      My accounting interpretations may not be completely correct, and there could be computation errors. Any bro could correct the numbers if you have accounting reasons to amend.
 
B)    Workings

1.  YFH Balance Sheet :- Nav increased from 107.45 to 109.23.

1a) Nav

+    Old Nav 1.0745 was referenced to 3937m shares as at 30Jun2022. Net Asset was $4230m.
+    Latest Nav 1.0923 in the 3Q report is referenced to 3744m shares as at 30Sep2022. YFH spent ~$79.62m to SBB 206m shares as at 30Sep2022 ( You will get these numbers if you use an excel worksheet to tabulate all the SBB quantities and values records until 30Sep2022 ).
+    Latest Net Asset = 1.0923 * 3744 = $4089m as at 30Sep2022.
+    The theoretical Nav per share of YFH as at 30Sep2022 based on just the SBB exercise alone should equate to (4230m &ndash 79.62m) / 3744 = 1.1085, assuming there is no RMB/SGD devaluation, net losses, or other unforeseen liabilities such as the one time deferred tax liabilities of undistributed income due to the spin off exercise.
+    So there is actually a drop in Nav = 1.1085 &ndash 1.0923 = 0.01624 per share or ~$61m (down) after accounting for the SBB effect.
+    Please note that latest Nav 1.0923 or Net Asset $4089m in the balance sheet is already net of SBB, RMB devaluation, NPL provisions and also the net profit/loss embedded in kinds in the current and non current assets.
 
1b)  RMB vs SGD ( Impact on reporting )

+    RMB down ~2.9% against SGD (exchange rate 4.82 on 30Jun2022 vs 4.96 on 30Sep2022)
+    $511m or 12% of group asset was still reflected in the balance sheet as at 30Sep2022 for offshore deployment. This should exclude the $79.62m already spent on SBB.
+    Net asset in RMB converted to SGD for reporting = 4089 &ndash 511 = $3578m, which included a translation loss of RMB to SGD of 2.9% = (3578 / 0.971) * 0.029 = ~$107m
 
1c) AUM

Note : AUM is not same as Nav. AUM is all the assets that the coy could deploy to earn incomes. Nav is simply total assets net of total liabilities.  
+    Net NPL is $762.7m or 31.5% of total DI. Total DI = 762.7 / 0.315 = $2421m
+    DI is 56% of total portfolio.
+    Hence Total portfolio or AUM = 2421 / 0.56 = $4323m as at 30Sep2022, which is net of the $79.62m spent on SBB, the $14.8m provision for NPL and fair value adjustments.
+    AUM was $4440m as at 30Jun2022.
+    There is a drop in AUM = 4440 &ndash 4323 = ~$117m, which is likely due mainly to the RMB devaluation against SGD.
 
My Interpretation :-

+    Assuming no other significant impact on the balance sheet except the (1) SBB, (2) RMB/SGD exchange rate, (3) NPL provision, (4) 3Q earning.
+    Theoretical Nav with SBB as at 30Sep2022 = 1.1084 * 3744m = $4150m (after SBB 206m shares)
+    Actual Nav as at 30Sep2022 in 3Q report = 1.0923 * 3744m = $4089m is net of SBB, RMB devaluation, NPL provision and 3Q earning.
+    There is a drop in Nav = 4150 &ndash 4089 = $61m, BUT Nav should drop more than $61m due to the $107m RMB devaluation loss and $14.8m NPL provisions, UNLESS there is a net gain that reduced this impact.
+    With SBB already accounted for, actual Nav should drop or increase by   (-107m) + (-14.8m) + (net earning)
+    Hence 4089m = 4150m &ndash 107m &ndash 14.8m   + net earning
+    Therefore Net earning in 3Q = $60.8m  

 
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sgng123
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07-Dec-2022 02:08     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Don worry too much, current low caused by china zero COVID lockdown.
the market trend is selldown Chinese based companies regardless of fundamental till china 
follow global standard of living with COVID.
Would take some time for YZJFH to recover once china exit zero COVID policy, stock slowly build on SSB and  buying by 
Stake owners.
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pasttime
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06-Dec-2022 19:34     
 
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 Alert Admin 		npl? in lending business not the same like a business where goods are supply in credit.
for lending business as long as the loan is cover by quality collateral exceeding the value of loan it is not going to be write down.
seize the collateral is a practise that loan provider will try not to do as it is more important that the borrower recover. in this way there will be future loan  cycle. 
ask any pawn shop owner and they will tell you, they even go to buy it back first to sell the collateral back the inital owner later. so that pawn business with the customer can continue.

seize collateral can also become more profit return in future. like some bank they seize shopping/office buidling then sell to subsidiary/related business, buyer the enjoy the rental income year after year. good deal in the end.
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soeteono
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06-Dec-2022 19:01     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Can write back in future if loads are not default ?

HVRRVH      ( Date: 06-Dec-2022 16:05) Posted:

I do agree it was a big surprised that NPL balloned from 1% to 30% within 3 months. The 1% figure was still being cited in Lim & Tan presentation not too long ago. Now what about year end figure? Will there be another ' nasty' surprise? I just don' t understand why the price has not been sold down below 335. Overall, I believe the situation will improve and I still can buy a bit more but I would not buy at current level, perhaps some big boys are distributing. I believe the price will come down to 300 and thats when I will buy a bit more. If the price doesn' t come down any furhter, I am fine with it as well. 

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Richardlai
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06-Dec-2022 16:50     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Was queing to buy some at 33 cents, will hold back first since its unclear where it is headed.
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HVRRVH
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06-Dec-2022 16:05     
 
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 Alert Admin 		I do agree it was a big surprised that NPL balloned from 1% to 30% within 3 months. The 1% figure was still being cited in Lim & Tan presentation not too long ago. Now what about year end figure? Will there be another ' nasty' surprise? I just don' t understand why the price has not been sold down below 335. Overall, I believe the situation will improve and I still can buy a bit more but I would not buy at current level, perhaps some big boys are distributing. I believe the price will come down to 300 and thats when I will buy a bit more. If the price doesn' t come down any furhter, I am fine with it as well. 
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sgng123
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06-Dec-2022 15:52     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Lol he just wanna buy cheap. Current market no retail selling only hedge fund shorting.
When china exit zero COVID , short covering would come fast and furious.
Be patient and enjoy the ride, china abt to reopen international.
Just see how RMB perform against USD u know.
 
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Amateurinvestor
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06-Dec-2022 14:20     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Wow if what you wrote is true, then really time to cut losses - I bought at an average of 41 cents if sell now lose about 18%

emailpeter      ( Date: 06-Dec-2022 13:04) Posted:

We have to revisit past discussions here. ASSET QUALITY. In the 3 mths to Sept 30, NPL ballooned from 2 to 31%. Thats a major jump of S$725, balanced against its estimated S$250 of yearly profit, thats a good 3 years danger.

1. They had a L& T seminar, only recited past data without disclosing us a hint of such NPL. FC played a dillusive game, even when questioned during the Q& A.

2. The Ren interview on The Edge a week after again deluded us away from it.

3. Now we can see the DI made up of loans interelated to [Quote] " A decline in income from property-related debt investments. The property sector in China has faced substantial challenges with developers encountering financial and liquidity setbacks, as widely reported in the media. This has affected the ability of some of our borrowers to make repayments on time."  
-and-
" The increase in NPLs arose because of interest and principal repayment delays from borrowers impacted by the struggling property sector in China. However, as most of the affected loans are still adequately collateralized, the Group has made the provision for loan losses of $14.8 million."

4. Correct me if I am wrong, who are they lending to ? It seems they are no different than the lenders or bondholders to developers like Evergrande or other property developers.

5. Does this leave FH with a pile of delinquent LA' s, and having to dig into those Land Titles that are equally depleted ? At only S$14.8m of provisions [2% of NPL categorised $777m], I certainly do not trust their assessment. If a proper bank provides 2% to NPL, that means there is zero NPL' s. So what is inside these 31% NPLs ? I mean, are they classifying NPLs as payment has been late by 2 minutes ?, or are we facing a huge onslaught of true defaulted NPLs ?

6. Something tells me divs will still be 40%, of some fiction profit, or at worst no profit at all.

emailpeter      ( Date: 03-Nov-2022 14:19) Posted:

Dear @Volvo125, again a cordial thank you for your fresh insights. This thread is more fundamental in nature, I beg your paron to post here. Although I am CPA trained, I will abstain from overanalysing your deep fundamental study of NTA & projected EPS of FH. For the simple fact of the big disparity (lets upgrade it to obscene) between its share (aka the public reading of its NTA) compared to your calculations. You' d agree the disparity is leaving only crumbs from its so called NTA.

As fellow investors, we have every reason to be concerned, without any clarity, we can only go by public related information disclosed of the conditions around them, note : around them. I am  concerned of their asset quality, hence we might well be basing calcs on figures that have hugely depleted. 

Again I repost below my confusion, over asset quality, and hope clued up ones like you and others can enlighten.....
-------------

30 June 2022      57% of the total portfolio
So these contain the micro loans to businesses, are these like banks where they hold a floating or fixed charge over its assets ? Or merely hold their title, in what form ? A fixed charge or merely caveat and transfer form signed ? Do they end up taking over the keys of the business ? What kind of businesses are all these, retail or wholesale, manufacturers or whatever ? Sounds like they will need some receivers or liquidators.    Their corporate loans are not a pile of FD' s that they can walk in to bank and claim, its a lot more convulated. If they are exiting this business and these borrowers are unable under these recession conditions to refinance, they might as well take FH to cleaners, default and " deem sold" land to FH, surely a big profit over their historical cost, which reflects as a huge NPL for FH.

Jiangsu province.  land title is held as collateral by the Group
Managing their cashflow and holding the land title (exactly what the bondholders and banks did with Evergrande). Seems like their funds went in as a Joint Venture. When sales collapse, or the buyers default, they are in the same boat as its developer. FH seems to be like a property developer in this case.  Again we only have faint info of this.    their land titles held on Jiangsu projects, they can' t just foreclose master title and auction while SPA' s are signed and sitting on it. And buyers houses built on them...

Cash and yield enhancement products and equity investments form approximately 29% and 14% of the total portfolio respectively.
Glad to hear the 29% remains intact. The dream team in SG can utilise this to work out their grandious plans. The 14% equity-surely depleted like the share price of FH, or main market. We don' t even know what shares they hold. At least name us the Top 5 equity it contains.

Vested with 600k shares now. Surely management owes its shareholders thees answers. OR BB' s like TR have privy and found it' s can of worms........


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emailpeter
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06-Dec-2022 13:04     
 
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 Alert Admin 		We have to revisit past discussions here. ASSET QUALITY. In the 3 mths to Sept 30, NPL ballooned from 2 to 31%. Thats a major jump of S$725, balanced against its estimated S$250 of yearly profit, thats a good 3 years danger.

1. They had a L& T seminar, only recited past data without disclosing us a hint of such NPL. FC played a dillusive game, even when questioned during the Q& A.

2. The Ren interview on The Edge a week after again deluded us away from it.

3. Now we can see the DI made up of loans interelated to [Quote] " A decline in income from property-related debt investments. The property sector in China has faced substantial challenges with developers encountering financial and liquidity setbacks, as widely reported in the media. This has affected the ability of some of our borrowers to make repayments on time."  
-and-
" The increase in NPLs arose because of interest and principal repayment delays from borrowers impacted by the struggling property sector in China. However, as most of the affected loans are still adequately collateralized, the Group has made the provision for loan losses of $14.8 million."

4. Correct me if I am wrong, who are they lending to ? It seems they are no different than the lenders or bondholders to developers like Evergrande or other property developers.

5. Does this leave FH with a pile of delinquent LA' s, and having to dig into those Land Titles that are equally depleted ? At only S$14.8m of provisions [2% of NPL categorised $777m], I certainly do not trust their assessment. If a proper bank provides 2% to NPL, that means there is zero NPL' s. So what is inside these 31% NPLs ? I mean, are they classifying NPLs as payment has been late by 2 minutes ?, or are we facing a huge onslaught of true defaulted NPLs ?

6. Something tells me divs will still be 40%, of some fiction profit, or at worst no profit at all.

emailpeter      ( Date: 03-Nov-2022 14:19) Posted:

Dear @Volvo125, again a cordial thank you for your fresh insights. This thread is more fundamental in nature, I beg your paron to post here. Although I am CPA trained, I will abstain from overanalysing your deep fundamental study of NTA & projected EPS of FH. For the simple fact of the big disparity (lets upgrade it to obscene) between its share (aka the public reading of its NTA) compared to your calculations. You' d agree the disparity is leaving only crumbs from its so called NTA.

As fellow investors, we have every reason to be concerned, without any clarity, we can only go by public related information disclosed of the conditions around them, note : around them. I am  concerned of their asset quality, hence we might well be basing calcs on figures that have hugely depleted. 

Again I repost below my confusion, over asset quality, and hope clued up ones like you and others can enlighten.....
-------------

30 June 2022      57% of the total portfolio
So these contain the micro loans to businesses, are these like banks where they hold a floating or fixed charge over its assets ? Or merely hold their title, in what form ? A fixed charge or merely caveat and transfer form signed ? Do they end up taking over the keys of the business ? What kind of businesses are all these, retail or wholesale, manufacturers or whatever ? Sounds like they will need some receivers or liquidators.    Their corporate loans are not a pile of FD' s that they can walk in to bank and claim, its a lot more convulated. If they are exiting this business and these borrowers are unable under these recession conditions to refinance, they might as well take FH to cleaners, default and " deem sold" land to FH, surely a big profit over their historical cost, which reflects as a huge NPL for FH.

Jiangsu province.  land title is held as collateral by the Group
Managing their cashflow and holding the land title (exactly what the bondholders and banks did with Evergrande). Seems like their funds went in as a Joint Venture. When sales collapse, or the buyers default, they are in the same boat as its developer. FH seems to be like a property developer in this case.  Again we only have faint info of this.    their land titles held on Jiangsu projects, they can' t just foreclose master title and auction while SPA' s are signed and sitting on it. And buyers houses built on them...

Cash and yield enhancement products and equity investments form approximately 29% and 14% of the total portfolio respectively.
Glad to hear the 29% remains intact. The dream team in SG can utilise this to work out their grandious plans. The 14% equity-surely depleted like the share price of FH, or main market. We don' t even know what shares they hold. At least name us the Top 5 equity it contains.

Vested with 600k shares now. Surely management owes its shareholders thees answers. OR BB' s like TR have privy and found it' s can of worms........


volvo125      ( Date: 02-Nov-2022 22:26) Posted:

This is my objective thought on YFH. Ignore if you think it is trash especially when probably everyone (including myself, of course) here is flushed with frustration and anger because the price indeed has been mysteriously thrashed down by some unknown forces for some unknown reasons & hellip .
 
YFH had in 1H22 result release achieved a NPAT $136m and then went on to guide its FY22 NPAT at $220m. NAV per share stood at 1.07 as at 30Jun22.
 
The persistent and violent sell down to all time low 0.31 seems to suggest that the coy is broken with either being
(1)  tainted with fraudulent investigations or
(2)  met with a going concern such as an imminent default risk or
(3)  expecting to incur huge FY22 net losses
 
It cannot be (1) because YFH was just spun off 5 months ago with a clean audited balance sheet and cash flow under the scrutiny of SGX approval. It also cannot be (2) because YFH is net cash with negligible s/t debt so the default risk is zero. So big Sellers and Shorts are likely betting YFH will miss its FY22 NPAT big time or worst still, incur a net FY22 loss due to the significant RMB devaluation against SGD/USD, higher NPL, weak China stock market & hellip . etc.
 
I have done a deeper analysis on YFH based on its 1H22 releases and projected its FY22 P& L and NAV per share. I believe YFH will hit its FY22 NPAT at $218~224m with NAV per share increase to 1.13 (at 90%SBB). Even if we were to factor in a further 10% impact on the 2H22 NPAT due to further US rate hikes of 0.75% in Nov and 0.5% in Dec, YFH FY22 NPAT will still hit ~$210m which is near to its target. The steep sell down to all time low 0.31 is fear mongering to the extreme.
 
I have yet to pick up anything fundamentally wrong with YFH except the market sentiment in general (Capital flights due to rising US interest rates) and the current China challenging economic and still ongoing covid zero conditions. So, to all the Longs, Steady.
 
The details are given below if you are interested to find out how the numbers are computed. Please note that the numbers are estimates at best based on opening and closing balances averages instead of actual monthly movement balances which are not available to the public. Also, the impact of RMB devaluation may also be mitigated by some forms of financial instrument hedges which professional fund and money managers such as YFH will know how to do. For the smaller segment non interest incomes, I will use the 1H22 as assumptions.
 
I am not a CPA or certified Public Accountant so if there is a brother here who is an accountant to validate my numbers or assumptions or blind spots or accounting treatments would be greatly appreciated. I certainly look forward to seeing YFH FY22 release in Feb23 to see how my crude projection compares.
 
1H22 is YFH latest release so it will form the baseline for our further analysis.
 
1H22 :-
 
NPAT $136m was achieved in 1H22 in spite of currency and financial market weakness :-
-  RMB v SGD down 2.3% ( 4.71 to 4.82, 31Dec21~30Jun22), Adversely affected as SGD is the reporting currency.
-  SGD v USD down 3% (1.35 to 1.39, 31Dec21~30Jun22)
-  RMB v USD down 5.3% (6.36 to 6.7, 31Dec21~30Jun22), this will adversely affect the first tranche of 11% (~$480m) fund transfer to Sg in 1H22.
-  100% China RMB portfolio on 1Jan22 to 89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 31Jun22. This 11% Sg USD portfolio can only be initiated after spin off in May so YFH was still on a major basis being exposed to RMB 2.3% devaluation against SGD for reporting purpose in 1H22, and on a minor basis to RMB 5.3% devaluation against USD on the 11% Sg portfolio or the reported SGD480m in USD denomination. The currency translation loss was likely 90%*4.44B*2% = ~$79m.
-  fair value adjustment ($19m losses) to the PRC $633m listed equity investments portfolio in Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange due to weak financial market sentiment (non interest income).
-  DI 70% ($3.5b) on 1Jan21 to DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22, this explained the lower interest income affecting the P& L in 1H22.
 
Now, let us attempt to construct the 2H22 P& L based on the known or extrapolated information below :-
 
2H22 :-
 
-  RMB v SGD down 6.6% (4.82 to 5.14, 30Jun22~1Nov22). RMB devaluation against SGD had further worsen by 3x the impact felt in 1H for reporting in SGD currency.
-  SGD v USD down 2.2% (1.39 to 1.42, 30Jun22~1Nov22)
-  RMB v USD down 8.2% (6.7 to 7.25, 30Jun22~1Nov22), this will adversely affect the transfer of second tranche 11% fund to Sg in 2H22.
-  89% China RMB v 11% Sg USD portfolio on 30Jun22 to 78% China RMB v 22% Sg USD portfolio by 31Dec22.
-   DI 57% ($2.53b) on 30Jun22 to DI 50% (est. $2.22b) by 31Dec22. Interest income will go lower than 1H22 and currency translation loss will increase to ~$150m (~6.5% RMB devaluation against SGD) and affecting the Bal Sht NAV. $1.75B DI will matured and ~$1.42B will be added to maintain DI at 50%.
-  there will be further fair value adjustment losses (?) to the PRC listed equity portfolio due to the continuous weakness in the PRC stock markets. We will best assume a further -$19m fair value losses as in 1H22.
-  We will also best assume the dividend income to remain steady at $7.6m
-  The steady state historical returns (interest income) for DI is ~12% pa or ~3% per quarter or ~6% per half year. The average DI return in 1H21 was 190m/[(3438m+3461m)/2] = 5.5%, and the average DI return in 1H22 was 184m/[(3514m+2659m)/2] = 5.96%. We will assume the 2H22 DI return at (5.5+5.96)/2 = 5.75%.
-  The average interest income in 2H22 = [(2.53B+2.2B)/2]*5.75% = $136m
-  We will also assume the SG& A expenses similar to 1H22 on the high side at $15m.
-  We assume no reversal or addition of allowance for credit or other losses and NPL stays at ~2% which is well covered by the 4.7% provisions ($123m) provided for the full amount of DI exposure.
-  1H21 tax was 24%, 1H22 tax was 19.5%. We will assume an average tax rate of 20% with 22% of portfolio in SG.
-  NPAT = [Interest income - non interest income losses & ndash expenses]*80% = [136-11-15]*80% = $88m
-  FY22 NPAT = 136m+88m = $224m or 136m+(82m*93%) = $218m if we tag a ~7% currency translation loss from RMB/SGD in 2H22.  
-  With 78% of portfolio in China (RMB) by 31Dec22, the currency translation loss = 0.78*4.44B*7% = $242m will affect reporting in SGD and will in turn adversely affected the NAV. SBB will counter this negative impact.
-    Assume SBB at 90% done by 31Dec22 or 0.9*395*0.38 average buyback price = 355m shares or $135m. As at 31Oct22, YFH spent $98.94m to buy back 259.56m shares at 0.381 average price.
-    NAV/share = (1H22NAV-355m SBB-currency translation loss+FY22 NPAT)/Outstanding shares = (4.226B-135-242+218)/(3950-355) = 1.13 before dividend being declared.
-    NAV will fall from 4.226B to 4.067B but NAV per share will increase from 1.07 to 1.13.
 
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sgng123
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06-Dec-2022 09:49     
 
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 Alert Admin 		Wait till china stock market open and if rally continue, YZJFH would rebounce from low since it kind of factor the worst case scenario.
Share buyback would reboot and depending on market sentiment toward china COVID easing, if ah moh fund buy in then stock should rebounce near 0.6x NTA.
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john1703
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06-Dec-2022 07:16     
 
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 Alert Admin 		I think the worst is over for China and it can only get better. Maybe some jitters here and there but it should pivot from here.
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sgng123
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06-Dec-2022 06:16     
 
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 Alert Admin 		YZJFH is COVID play as long china exit zero COVID and gradually open up, stock price would recover.
Today most likely would drop then rebound on SSB and COVID easing hope on wed.
Anyway already get cut by half from IPO nothing much to lose lol.
Yesterday when china stocks rebounce , unchanged though it drop on 3q update leak but recovered later.
Pray hard on wed china new easing rule got impact and major market rebounced and short covering happen.
YZJFH recovery heavily depend on china exit from zero COVID policy. 3q update pin poor performance on china zero COVID lockdown.
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